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1SOVEREIGNTY, SELF-DETERMINATION AND ENVIRONMENT-BASED CULTURES:
THE EMERGING VOICE OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Peter Manus 
Indigenous peoples= collective right to their land and territories is the most 
controversial of all human rights issues . . . . Control over indigenous lands, water 
and resources is also by far the issue that gives rise to most violent conflicts and to 
human rights violations committed by governments, police, mining companies, 
logging companies, etc. 
C International Working Group for Indigenous Affairs, June 20051
The term Aindigenous peoples@ describes racially distinct populations with long-term histories 
connecting them with identified areas of land situated within the borders of globally recognized 
nations.2 Within this construct, the indigenous peoples concept relies on temporal, cultural, racial 
and territorial elements as identifiers of particular indigenous communities.3 Of central importance 
 
1 International Working Group for Indigenous Affairs, Strategy for the 2nd Decade on Indigenous Peoples (June 
2005), http://iwgia.inforce.dk/graphics/Synkron-Library/Documents/Noticeboard/News/SecondDecadeStrategy.htm. 
2 See. e.g., Final report by M. A. Martinez, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1999/20, 22 June 1999, cited in PATRICK 
THORNBERRY, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND HUMAN RIGHTS 2 (Melland Schill Studies in International Law, 2002); see also 
id. at 2 (identifying various views on the breadth of the term Aindigenous peoples@). 
See also Catherine J. Iorns, Indigenous Peoples and Self Determination: Challenging State Sovereignty, 24 
CASE W. RES. J. INT=L L. 199 (1993): 
[A]n indigenous people is not merely one that lived in a place before others arrived, which 
distinguishes indigenous peoples from other types of minorities, but that they are also a self-identified, 
culturally distinct, non-dominant group within a larger state.  This stresses their oppression and their 
need for protection and excludes, for the purposes of devising measures for the protection of 
indigenous peoples, those who are presently dominant in their Aown@ state. 
Id. at n.1. 
3 See THORNBERRY, supra note 2, at 37-40 (identifying four elements of indigenousness: association with a 
particular place, status as a prior inhabitant, status as an original or first inhabitant, and identity as a distinctive society).  
See also id. at 55, identifying Aelements of the indigenous discriptors@ to include: 
precedent habitation; 
historical continuity; 
attachment to land; 
the communal sense and the communal right (including those societies which do not have a 
strong conception of individual rights); 
a cultural gap between the dominant groups in a State and the indigenous, and the colonial 
context. 
To these may be added the specific of self-identification as indigenous peoples.@ (emphasis in 
original) 
2among these elements in defining a community of people as indigenous is the people=s various 
associations with a particular environment.4 Both the people=s historical connection with its 
environment B the fact that it occupied the land prior to a European settler=s assertion of sovereignty 
B and the nature of its relationship with the environment B whether static or nomadic, for example, or 
exclusive or shared B are core features of an indigenous people=s identity.5
Environment-based elements of an indigenous people=s identity are also core to defining its 
rights in the eyes of the nation under whose domestic authority it resides, as a people=s particular use 
of its land has served as the rationale for its conquest, its removal from a land area, and other 
constraints on its control over territory and natural resources, such as its ability to regulate natural 
resource exploitation by non-indigenous persons.6 Prominent among the various rationales for 
 
4 Id. at 37: AIn the first, the term suggests association with a particular place (usually lengthy) B a locality, a 
region, a country, a State.  Place is important: a particular place, not an amorphous space. . . . The coupling of space and 
peoples alerts us to the importance of territory, of land rights in the indigenous context, the safeguarding and promotion 
of which is a key reflex.@ (emphasis in original) 
5 See John Woodliffe, Biodiversity and Indigenous Peoples, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE CONSERVATION 
OF BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY 256 (1996): 
Present estimates are that among the 250 million indigenous peoples spread over seventy B mainly 
developing B countries there are some 5,000 peoples distinguishable by culture, language and 
geographical separation. . . . What all these communities have in common is a profound relationship 
with the land . . . and respect for nature. 
See also Osvaldo Kreimer, Indigenous Peoples= Rights to Land, Territories, and Natural Resources: A 
Technical Meeting of the OAS Working Group, 10 HUMAN RIGHTS 13 (Winter, 2003) 
Central among [the demands of indigenous peoples] are issues related to land, territories, and natural 
resources. . . . [T]hese rights are not merely real estate issues, and shall not be conceived according to 
the classical civil law approach to Aownership.@ Rather, indigenous land rights encompass a broader 
and different concept that relates to the collective right to survival as an organized people, with control 
of their habitat as a condition necessary for the reproduction of their culture and for their own 
development, or as indigenous experts prefer, for carrying ahead their Alife plans@ (planes de vida) and 
their political and social institutions. 
Id. at (13? - Westlaw didn=t make page number available, although quote is from near beginning). 
See also S. James Anaya, International Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples: the Move Toward the 
Multicultural State, 21 ARIZ. J. INT=L & COMP. L. 13, 35 (2004): AWhile the particular characteristics of indigenous 
cultures vary among diverse groups, a common feature tends to be a strong connection with lands and natural resources.@
6 See THORNBERRY, supra note 2, at 72: 
[The North American Indian nations=] unsettled habitation in those immense regions cannot be 
accounted a true and legal possession; and the people of Europe, too closely pent up at home . . . were 
3disregarding or terminating an indigenous people=s territorial rights is the fact that indigenous 
peoples tend to live lightly on the land, and thus do not produce through their lifestyles the kind of 
evidence of dominion that European-rooted cultures are willing to recognize as worthy of legal 
protection.7 In other words, the legal and political vulnerability of indigenous peoples rests heavily 
on the fact that indigenous life patterns are, generally speaking, environmentally benign, and so differ 
fundamentally from the life patterns of the dominant cultures, whose laws, moral codes, and life 
patterns are, generally speaking, environmentally exploitive.8 Thus, the environmental values of 
indigenous peoples are not merely a distinguishing feature of their cultures; they are a key element of 
their disenfranchised status. 
 
lawfully entitled to take possession of it, and settle it with colonies.  The earth . . . belongs to mankind 
in general, and was destined to furnish them with subsistence . . . 
quoting from E. DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 100 (J. Chitty ed. 1897). 
7 Id.: AIf each nation had . . . resolved to appropriate to itself a vast country, that the people might live only by 
hunting, fishing, and wild fruits, our globe would not be sufficient to maintain a tenth part of its present inhabitants.@
8 See, e.g., WILLIAM CRONIN, CHANGES IN THE LAND: INDIANS, COLONISTS, AND THE ECOLOGY OF NEW 
ENGLAND (Hill and Wang, 2003): 
English colonists could use Indian hunting and gathering as a justification for expropriating Indian 
land.  To European eyes, Indians appeared to squander the resources that were available to them. . . . 
Because the Indians were so few, and Ado but run over the grass, as do also the foxes and wild beasts,@
[Pilgrim apologist Robert] Cushman declared their land to be Aspacious and void,@ free for English 
taking. 
Id. at 56, citing Robert Cushman, Reasons and Considerations Touching on the Lawfulness of Removing Out of England 
into the Parts of America, in ALEXANDER YOUNG, ED., CHRONICLES OF THE PILGRIM FATHERS 243 (Boston, 1841). 
4The latter decades of the twentieth century witnessed a steep growth in global awareness of 
both the importance and vulnerability of indigenous peoples, as documented in international 
instruments as well as domestic constitutions and legislation.9 Historically, attempts to apply the 
broad pledges of protectionism set forth in such instruments to individual assertions of environment-
related indigenous rights have tended to reveal such pledges as limited in their ability to provide 
actual or specific relief.10 Recently, however, both the language of international instruments and 
certain court decisions indicate the emergence of a new era in which the rights of indigenous peoples 
may enjoy a more meaningful presence in international law.  A number of these instruments and 
decisions protect indigenous interests that are environmental in nature, thereby overriding the 
historical presumption that environmental resources fall firmly under the control of whatever nation 
within whose borders they are located.11 For this reason, events such as the 2002 Inter-American 
Court decision on the rights of the Awas Tingni Community against Nicaragua12 and the still-
developing American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples13 stand as particularly 
noteworthy harbingers of the changing landscape of international law as a vehicle for addressing 
indigenous peoples= rights. 
This momentum in international law make the present an appropriate moment to review some 
 
9 See, e.g., Kreimer, supra note 5 (discussing amplifying efforts of the Organization of American States to 
address the unique issues involved in protecting indigenous peoples= rights, as well as various constitutional efforts to 
acknowledge the concept of indigenous peoples habitats). 
10 See Lawrence Watters, Indigenous Peoples and the Environment: Convergence from a Nordic Perspective,
20 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL=Y 237, 243 (2001/2002): AThe approval and adoption of an international convention does 
not necessarily create a domestic standard incorporating the treaty=s provision in the law of a state.@
11 See, e.g., infra notes 36-38 and accompanying text. 
12 The Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Judgment of August 31, 2002, 
INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS.
13 ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, PROPOSED 
AMERICAN DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES (Approved by the Inter-American Commission on 
5of the means that have been utilized in efforts to protect indigenous peoples= land and natural 
resources from destructive exploitation by non-indigenous parties.  In that interest, this article 
presents a survey of both the rhetoric and applications of international law addressing indigenous 
peoples= environmental rights.  As a prefatory matter, Part I briefly assesses three terms that are 
widely used in international instruments C sovereignty, human rights, and self-determination C for 
their applicability to the environment-related interests of indigenous peoples.14 Building on Part I, 
Part II presents a sixty year litany of international instruments C some of which directly address 
indigenous peoples= rights, others of which make environmental interests their primary focus, and 
still others of which focus more broadly on the rights of all persons C as a means of evaluating the 
evolution of global awareness of the uniquely vulnerable position that indigenous peoples occupy in 
the world community in connection with their environmental interests.15 
Part III presents two diverse international court disputes which relied on the rhetoric and 
instruments discussed in Parts I and II in focusing on the environmental rights of indigenous 
peoples.16 First, Part III utilizes the 1985 case of Kitok v. Sweden as a prominent example of the 
international community=s analysis of the environmental rights of indigenous peoples in the human 
rights context.17 Kitok illustrates two closely related issues identified in Parts I and II: the sometimes 
irreconcilable conflict between individual and collective interests and the essential disconnect 
between human and environmental rights.  Next, and in sharp contrast, Part III presents the 2002 
Inter-American Court decision in The Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. 
 
Human Rights, Feb. 26, 1997), OEA/Ser/L/V/.II.95 Doc.6 (1997). 
14 See infra notes 20-60 and accompanying text. 
15 See infra notes 61-222 and accompanying text.   
16 See infra notes 223-322 and accompanying text. 
6Nicaragua.18 Although the Awas Tingni decision did not, in and of itself, immediately and 
conclusively resolve the environmental issues it addressed, it nevertheless stands as a judicial 
triumph of an indigenous people over a dominant culture that would have exploited its 
environmental resources without regard to its heritage, its need for and occupation of its territory, or 
the state and international instruments in which indigenous control over such resources have been 
recognized as a matter of self-determination.  As such, the case validates the international effort to 
promulgate the declarations, conventions, and other multinational agreements that encourage nations 
to honor the environmental rights of indigenous peoples. 
Finally, Part IV concludes this Article with a discussion of the 2003 draft American 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, a document which, if promulgated in its present 
iteration, will present the world with forceful rhetoric that directly and fully addresses the 
environmental rights of indigenous peoples throughout the western hemisphere.19 In light of all that 
has preceded it, the American Declaration will be an appropriate continuation of international law=s
trajectory in the area of indigenous peoples= environmental rights.  
I. An Environmentalist Perspective on the Terminology of International 
Instruments Addressing Indigenous Peoples= Rights 
 
Over the past half century, and increasingly as non-indigenous cultures have struggled to 
discover in themselves an environmental conscience, both domestic and international law have 
addressed the status of indigenous peoples through means that attempt to define their authority, at 
 
17 See infra notes 229-277 and accompanying text. 
18 See infra notes 278-322 and accompanying text. 
19 See infra notes 323-352 and accompanying text. 
7least in part, in terms of their environmental values.20 Concepts like sovereignty, human rights, and 
self-determination have been employed in these efforts.21 As a preface to Part II=s analysis of various 
international law instruments, the following sections present a brief overview of the three concepts, 
focusing on defining each term in the context of indigenous peoples, and also identifying their 
weaknesses and strengths as means of protecting indigenous peoples= environmental interests. 
A. Sovereignty 
The inflow of the white race cannot be stopped where there is land to cultivate, ore to 
be mined, commerce to be developed, sport to enjoy, curiosity to be satisfied . . . 
International law has to treat . . . natives as uncivilized.  It regulates, for the mutual 
benefit of civilized States, the claims which they make to sovereignty . . . and leaves 
the treatment of the natives to the conscience of the State to which sovereignty is 
awarded.22 
Although a Acornerstone of international rhetoric,@23 sovereignty is a highly elastic concept, 
with application to both international and internal state affairs.24 In either setting, any particular 
 
20 See, e.g., infra notes 147-221 and accompanying text. 
21 Some commentators have observed a fluid relationship among the terms.  See, e.g., Father Robert Araujo, 
Sovereignty, Human Rights, and Self-determination: The Meaning of International Law, 24 FORDHAM INT=L L.J. 1477, 
1480 (2001): A[S]overeignty, which is exercised by people in their exercise of self-determination, is also a matter that 
needs to be protected as an important human right.@ See also id. at 1485: AA sovereign nation is a community of people 
who exercise shared values concerning human dignities that shape and direct the particulars of their communitarian self-
determination.@
22 THORNBERRY, supra note 2, quoting from J. WESTLAKE, CHAPTERS ON THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 142-43 (Cambridge, The University Press, 1894). 
23 Iorns, supra note 2, at 236-37 (ADespite repeated appeals to the principles of sovereignty, the concept of 
sovereignty is not clear.  This is due largely to its historical origin n the concept of a sovereign rule of a state, who 
theoretically had absolute power.  In international law, however, no state has absolute power: all states must respect each 
other=s integrity and are considered legally equal, even if not equal in fact.@). 
24 See id. at 236 (defining external sovereignty as that Aconcerned with relationships between international 
personalities,@ and internal sovereignty as Aconcerned with internal self-government: the state=s right to devise its own 
constitutional and political institutions, enact and enforce its own laws, and to make decisions concerning citizens and 
residents of the state, without the interference of another state.@). 
See also Dan Sarooshi, The Essentially Contested Nature of the Concept of Sovereignty: Implications for the 
Exercise by International Organizations of Delegated Powers of Government, 25 MICH. J. INT=L L. 1107, 1108-09: 
A[T]he concept of sovereignty, as the ultimate and supreme power of decision, can be both analyzed and qualified from 
the perspective of what can be called >contested elements:= such elements as legal versus political sovereignty, external 
versus internal sovereignty, indivisible versus divisible sovereignty, and governmental versus popular sovereignty. . . . 
8assertion of sovereignty, as well as its acceptance by others, are far less a matter of fundamental 
justice than they are products of political and historical reality.25 It may be safe to observe that in all 
or most usages the sovereignty concept contains within it a connotation of some form of 
governmental or government-like power, but the breadth and depth of that power, as well as the 
realm over which it presides, can be key factors in determining the practical significance of any 
particular acknowledgment of sovereignty.26 
[T]he very existence of the concept of sovereignty generates continual arguments as to its core criteria.@
25 See, e.g., THORNBERRY, supra note 2, at 74: 
To many European lawyers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, some indigenous peoples were 
so low in the scale of civilisation and their forms of social organization and concepts of property so 
incomprehensible, so incommensurate with >advanced= models, that their lands were regarded as terra 
nullius [or land belonging to noone]. 
The configuration of terra nullius . . . was extensively discussed by the jurist M. F. Lindley. . 
. . . He divided jurists into three classes: (I) those who regarded backward peoples as possessing a title 
to the sovereignty which they inhabit which is good against more highly civilised peoples; (II) those 
who admit title but with qualifications; and (III) those who do not consider that the natives possess 
rights of such a nature as to be a bar to the assumption of sovereignty over them by more highly 
civilised peoples. 
Id.  See also id. at 75:  ANineteenth-century doctrine presents a mixed picture on the question of indigenous status.  There 
was a tendency, particularly marked among English and American writers, to write off the sovereignty of native tribes.  
This went beyond a denial of their statehood, which is one thing, to a claim that their lands were assimilable to 
uninhabited territory.@
See also W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law, 84 AM. J. 
INT=L L. 866, 866-67 (1990): A[Through history, s]overeignty often came to be an attribute of a powerful individual, 
whose legitimacy over territory (which was often described as his domain and even identified with him) rested on a 
purportedly direct or delegated divine or historic authority but certainly not . . . on the consent of the people.@ See also 
id. at 874: AThere is no international test of the legitimacy of a self-proclaimed government.  The only test is internal 
naked power.@
26 See Ivan Simonovic, Relative Sovereignty of the Twenty First Century, 25 HASTINGS INT=L & COMP. L. REV.
371, 376: AThe core issue of sovereignty B whether we speak about its internal or external aspects B is a question of 
distribution of power. . . .  Sovereign states are mutually equal, respect each other=s monopoly in handling internal affairs, 
and enter into international obligations only on the basis of consensus.@
See also Sarooshi, supra note 24, at 1114: AThe concept of sovereignty has always been associated with an 
entitlement to exercise governmental powers in the internal and external domain, but his has always been subject to 
sovereign values that have conditioned its exercise.@ Id. at 1115-16: A[T]he exercise of public powers of government can 
only be considered an exercise of sovereign powers when they are in accord with sovereign values, otherwise the exercise 
of public powers is something entirely distinct from the exercise of sovereign powers and can even be considered as a 
violation of sovereignty.@
See also Winston P. Nagan, Craig Hammer, The Changing Character of Sovereignty in International Law and 
International Relations, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT=L L. 141 (2004) (exploring the evolving nature of sovereignty in the 
international law context): 
91. Indigenous Peoples as Sovereigns 
In U.S. culture, for example, the early Supreme Court recognized the American Indian tribes 
as sovereigns when, in the landmark case of Worcester v. Georgia, Chief Justice John Marshall 
characterized the Cherokee tribe as Aa sovereign nation [with rights] to govern themselves and all 
persons who have settled within their territory.@27 Forthrightly as this statement reads, it applied only 
to the relationship between Indian nations and Athe several states;@ tribal sovereignty=s power in the 
face of that asserted by the U.S. federal government was another question.28 In short, the U.S. Courts 
have used the term  sovereignty in the native American context to indicate a degree of authority that 
is far less than fully autonomous.  As one commentator summed up the U.S. position:  A[The 
Cherokee cases] elaborate the notion of the quasi-sovereignty of Indian nations; they are sovereign 
enough to enter into treaties with the purpose of ceding title to their territory, but they are not 
sovereign enough to function as independent political entities or . . . to protect the remnants of their 
sovereignty.@29 
In contrast, non-U.S. courts have tended to refrain from recognizing indigenous peoples as 
sovereigns.  Both the Canadian and Australian high courts, for example, appear to consciously 
reserve the term to describe their current, northern European-rooted governments, and make few 
 
[The] abuse of sovereignty de-legitimizes the State=s sovereignty.  State abuse of sovereignty fueled by 
authoritarian, totalitarian, or chauvinist ideologies has indeed created a crisis of legitimacy for the view 
of international relations and law based on the juridical artifact symbolized by the treaty of 
Westphalia: the sovereign nation-State.  Sovereignty is not a license to kill, to make war, to commit 
crimes against the peace, to disparage basic human rights, to despoil the ecosystem, to subject human 
aspirations to the whims of caprice or avarice or to arbitrary expedience flowing from the barrel of a 
gun, or to strip human beings of all vestiges of essential dignity. 
Id. at 177. 
27 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 540 (1832). 
28 Id. 
29 THORNBERRY, supra note 2, at 80, quoting E/CN.4/Sub.2/1996/23, para. 54. 
10 
references to tribal cultures as sovereign even when acknowledging tribes as distinct peoples with 
long-established, externally-recognized societal structures.  This is not to say that the courts of 
Canada and Australia refuse to perceive indigenous peoples as having rights based on their historical 
presence and culture.  To the contrary, landmark decisions like the Canadian Supreme Court decision 
in Sparrow v. R30 and the Australian High Court decision in Mabo v. Queensland31 have recognized 
indigenous peoples as maintaining comparable if not superior interests to those recognized by the 
U.S. Court under the native sovereignty rubric.  Thus, what the non-U.S. courts indicate through 
their non-recognition of indigenous peoples as sovereigns may be no more complicated than that 
these courts simply define sovereignty as the governmental authority wielded by globally-recognized 
nation states.32 If this is true, then declarations of indigenous sovereignty in international 
instruments are bound to be perceived by many nations as overreaching, severely limited insofar as 
what they are attempting to assert, precatory, or even meaningless.33 
2. Sovereignty as Authority over the Environment 
Tensions between indigenous peoples and modern nation states take many forms, but 
none is quite so definitive as the question of resource sovereignty34 
30 Sparrow v. R, 1 S.C.R. 1075 (1990) (recognizing in the Canadian government a fiduciary responsibility 
toward Canadian aboriginal tribes, which responsibility was constitutionalized in 1982).   
31 Mabo v. Queensland, 107 A.L.R. 1 (1992) (recognizing an Australian aboriginal tribe to hold proprietary 
interests in its environmental resources). 
32 For a similar definition of sovereignty, see, e.g., JACK DONNOLLY, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 5 
(Westview Press, 1993) (defining sovereignty as Apolitical units that do not recognize a higher authority).  
33 See S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 6 (Oxford Univ. Press 2004):
 Advocates for indigenous peoples point to a history in which Aoriginal@ sovereignty of 
indigenous communities over defined territories has been illegitimately taken from them or suppressed. 
 But while appealing to many, this strain of argument must confront international law=s strong 
historical doctrinal tendency, precisely at its height in the nineteenth century, to view as unqualified for 
statehood non-European indigenous peoples and to instead favor the consolidation of power of them 
by the  European states and their colonial offspring. 
34 Richard Howitt, John Connell, Philip Hirsch, Resources, Nations and Indigenous Peoples, in RICHARD 
11 
 
In addition to demonstrating the elasticity of the term sovereignty, Chief Justice Marshall=s
recognition of American Indian tribes as sovereigns allows U.S. law to illustrate the unreliability of 
an indigenous peoples= sovereignty as a means of protecting its environmental interests.  Justice 
Marshall=s Cherokee opinions do link sovereignty to the environment; in fact, the Court=s recognition 
of tribal sovereignty as a lower or weaker form of sovereignty than that of the U.S. federal 
government is its primary rationale for finding the American Indians= title to their land to be less than 
absolute.35 The Court=s logic makes clear that, at least in Justice Marshall=s view, tribal sovereignty 
was undoubtedly if not essentially territorial.36 
Several twentieth century U.S. Supreme Court opinions indicate that an environmental 
element remains central to the concept of sovereignty in U.S. culture.  The Court=s 1979 opinion in 
Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Association, for example, 
found Native American authority over the natural resources within tribal territory, at least to the 
extent necessary for subsistence and commercial needs, to have remained intact in spite of the tribes 
 
HOWITT ET AL., RESOURCES, NATIONS AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 1 (Oxford Univ. Press, 1996).  See also id., at 3: 
A[I]ndigenous status is . . . an inherently political issue, notably in the sense that it inherently entails claims to certain 
rights over the use, management and flow of benefits from resource-based industries.@
35 See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 540 (1832) (identifying the Cherokee nation as Aa sovereign nation 
[with rights] to govern themselves and all persons who have settled within their territory@).  See also Cherokee Nation v. 
Georgia, 30 U.S. (Pet.) 1, 17 (1831) (characterizing American Indian tribes as Adomestic dependent nations@). 
36 See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S., at 540; id. at 544 (explaining that the British assertion of sovereignty as a 
colonizer of the North American continent did not destroy the rights of aboriginal occupants of their lands); id.at 557 
(asserting that the post-Revolutionary U.S. federal government viewed Athe several Indian tribes as distinct political 
communities, having territorial boundaries, within which their authority is exclusive, and having a right to all the lands 
within those boundaries . . .@) . See also Cherokee Nation v. Georgia 30 U.S. (Pet.) 17 (acknowledging that the American 
Indian tribes had Aunquestioned rights to the lands they occupy@); Johnson v. M=Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 574 
(1823) (recognizing the Piankeshaw as holding occupany rights in their land, which amounted to a title interest that 
included the right to physically possess and even control their land, but which fell short of full ownership due to the 
federal government=s ultimate right to alienate). 
12 
having entered treaties under which they relinquished most of their interests in their territories.37 
While the primary focus of Washington was on interpreting treaty language, the case nevertheless 
illustrates the centrality of environmental elements in defining sovereignty.38 
Likewise, the 1981 landmark decision of Montana v. United States relied heavily on the 
Court=s characterization of land underlying a navigable waterway as a fundamental incident of 
sovereignty, therefore verifying the environment-sovereignty link in the U.S. Court.39 The Montana 
Court, however, recognized the centrality of navigable waters to sovereignty only where such 
recognition protected the U.S. federal government=s interest in the land underlying such waters.  
Where the Court discussed the sovereignty of indigenous peoples, it limited it to a tribe=s jurisdiction 
over its own members, thus displaying that the breadth and significance of sovereignty depended on 
its context.40 Subsequent cases have seized on the Montana decision=s membership-based view of 
tribal sovereignty as a means of diminishing Native American territorial authority, with a minority of 
Justices maintaining the view that tribal sovereignty B like all sovereignty B necessarily includes the 
power to regulate the use of the sovereign=s lands and natural resources.41 In sum, U.S. law 
 
37 Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Assn., 443 U.S. 658 (1979) 
(establishing tribal rights to the share of fish necessary to support their subsistence and commercial needs, as opposed to 
the tribes merely having the right to compete for fish with non-Indians on an equal opportunity basis). 
38 Id. at 674-79 (interpreting the treaty language by referencing the centrality of fishing to Indian dietary, 
commercial, social and religious customs, and thereby acknowledging the interdependence of American Indian 
environment and culture). 
39 Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 552 (1981) (declaring the ownership of land under navigable waters 
to be an incident of U.S. federal sovereignty that a court cannot find to have been conveyed Aexcept because of >some 
international duty or public exigency.=@), quoting United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 55 (1926).    
40 Id. at 563-67 (asserting that tribal sovereignty is generally limited to tribal power over members of the tribe, 
and not over tribal territory except where territorial regulation is required to protect against a threat to a tribe=s political or 
economic security). 
41 For example, in Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 422 
(1989), the plurality acknowledged the possibility that the authority to zone reservation land might emanate from a tribe=s
Astatus as an independent sovereign.@ Ultimately, however, the plurality concluded that any inherent sovereignty a tribe 
possessed over tribal lands was compromised by its external relations, so that a tribe lost whatever regulatory authority it 
13 
illustrates well the fundamentally political and subjective nature of sovereignty, and its particularly 
chameleon-like nature in the environmental context. 
B. Human Rights 
Much like the moral discourse engaged in by pre-nineteenth-century theorists who 
are associated with the early development of international law and who questioned 
the legality of colonial patterns, the contemporary human rights discourse has the 
welfare of human beings as its subject and is concerned only secondarily, if at all, 
with the interests of sovereign entities.  Within the human rights framework, 
indigenous peoples are groups of human beings with fundamental human rights 
concerns that deserve attention.@42 
Declarations of human rights in international instruments characteristically invoke the Abasic@
or Afirst-generation@ rights of individuals, asserting that each person, regardless of culture, race, or 
citizenship, maintains certain essential physical needs such as life, nourishment and shelter, along 
with expectations of some base level of humane treatment by the authorities under which he or she 
resides.43 At its narrowest, such humane treatment includes an individual=s freedom from violent 
coercive treatment such as rape and torture, physical liberty except in connection with prompt and 
fair legal process, recognition under and access to the law, and religious freedom.44 Human rights 
may also include interests related to a peoples= cultural and historical heritage, but, again, such rights 
 
had over tribal lands when such lands were owned by nonmembers.  Id. at 425-28.  In concurrence, Justice Stevens 
averred that tribal sovereignty included the power to exclude nonmembers from tribal land, a power he construed as 
inclusive of the lesser power to regulate land use.  Id. at 433-35 (Stevens, J., concurring).  In dissent, Justice Blackmun 
asserted that tribal sovereignty was geographical in nature, and thus applied to all reservation land unless its exercise 
would be Ainconsistent with the overriding interests of the National Government.@ Id. at 450, (Blackmun, J., dissenting) 
quoting from Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980).  
42 ANAYA, supra note 33, at 7. 
43 For a discussion of first and second generation rights, see infra notes 99-103 and accompanying text. 
44 See, e.g., the UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, U.N.G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810 
(1948) (addressing fundamental freedoms such as the freedom from slavery (see Art. 4); freedom from torture (see Art. 
5); the right to equality (see Art. 7 and 10); freedom from arbitrary arrest (see Art. 9); the freedom to marry and have a 
family (see Art. 16); freedom of thought and religion (see Art. 18); freedom of expression (see Art. 19); freedom of 
assembly (see Art. 53)). 
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are commonly expressed in international instruments as rights held by individual members of a 
cultural group, rather than by the collective.45 
As such, human rights instruments may certainly be useful to indigenous peoples if upheld.46 
Without doubt, individuals who are members of an indigenous group have as great a need for 
protection against persecution and other inhuman treatment as any other human beings living under 
the authority of a particular sovereign.47 That fact granted, the language and focus of human rights in 
international literature tends not to be presented in a way that indicates any contemplation that it 
might include the environmental interests of indigenous peoples.48 Although indigenous 
communities relate to land and natural resources in diverse ways, a basic characteristic of many 
indigenous peoples= territorial and other environmental interests is that they are collective.49 
Collective interests in land, flora and fauna are rarely identified as essential rights in documents 
describing basic human rights, and although a nuanced reading of human rights language may reveal 
 
45 See THORNBERRY, supra note 2, at 96: A[I]t can easily be assumed that self-determination as a group right 
essentially goes against the grain of human rights . . .@
46 See, e.g., Benedict Kingsbury, Reconciling Five Competing Conceptual Structures of Indigenous Peoples=
Claims in International and Comparative Law, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT=L L. & POL. 189 (2001): 
[T]he adaptation of the category of Ahuman rights@ is of fundamental importance in addressing 
indigenous issues, and . . . courts and state institutions often prefer to address such issues within this 
frame, but practice and experience suggest that additional concepts are needed and often are deployed. 
 Issues connected with distinct histories, cultures, and identities animate the search for alternative 
concepts of international law and national law related to, but going beyond, individual human rights 
and non-discrimination. 
Id. at 202. 
47 See THORNBERRY, supra note 2, at 20:  AIn an argument for collective rights, a representative of the Grand 
Council of the Crees stated that when indigenous peoples are attacked, >individuals suffer the pain . . . But they suffer 
because they are perceived by their attackers as members of a group=.@
48 See id. at 98 (observing that Athe Universal Declaration is sometimes portrayed as a hymn to individualism@). 
49 See, e.g., ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS,
PROPOSED AMERICAN DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, supra note 13, at Preamble, para. 5: 
Recognizing that in many indigenous cultures, traditional collective systems for control and use of 
land, territory and resources, including bodies and water and coastal areas, are a necessary condition 
for their survival, social organization, development and their individual and collective well-being; and 
that the form of such control and ownership is varied and distinctive and does not necessarily coincide 
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a level of sensitivity to both community and racial concerns, the fact remains that collective 
territorial and other environmental interests do not translate readily into the so-called essential or 
first-generation interests of individuals, even where such individuals are members of an indigenous 
people.50 
Also important in identifying the limitations of human rights protections as a means of 
defending the environmental interests of indigenous peoples is the fact that the primary thrust of 
many human rights instruments is that of providing individuals who are members of a non-dominant 
ethnic or cultural group with a set of rights that are considered essential to members of the dominant 
ethnic or culture group under whose sovereign authority the non-dominant group resides.51 In at 
least some international instruments, it appears that the dominant culture=s perspective on land and 
natural resource ownership presumptively define the environment-related human rights of indigenous 
persons, so that international instruments that address land-related basic interests limit their focus to 
that of individual ownership of property.52 
with the systems protected by the domestic laws of the states in which they live. 
50 See Kingsbury, supra note 46, at 193:  AWhether issues raised by indigenous peoples can be addressed 
exclusively within the existing framework of international human rights law or whether, by contrast, a new legal category 
of indigenous peoples= rights requires recognition is a fundamental political debate . . .@
See also THORNBERRY, supra note 2, at 98 (pointing out that the types of rights that tend to be identified as 
human rights do not appear to include communitarian notions).  But see id. at 98-99 (offering a Amore nuanced@ reading 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, under which the Declaration may be discerned as advocating for the 
protection of group or community rights). 
51 See THORNBERRY, supra note 2, at 108-14 (discussing the dominant position of the State under whose 
protection minority or indigenous persons live in interpreting and protecting their human rights).  
52 See, e.g., the EUROPEAN CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL 
FREEDOMS, discussed supra, notes 59-60 and accompanying text.  S. James Anaya has noted that, in spite of differing 
concepts of property existing in various societies, A[i]nasmuch as property is a human right, the fundamental norm of non-
discrimination requires recognition of the forms of property that arise from the traditional or customary land tenure of 
indigenous peoples, in addition to the property regimes created by the dominant society.@ See Anaya, supra note 5, at 37 
(also observing that A[several United Nations and Organization of American States] studies and declarations have 
highlighted that among the most troublesome manifestations of historical discrimination against indigenous peoples has 
been the lack of recognition of indigenous modalities of property@).  Id. 
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C. Self-Determination 
The claim by indigenous peoples for self-determination is a reference to the idea of 
freedom from oppressors and the right to determine their future, their own form of 
government, as well as the extent of self-government. . . . This can range from 
complete independence and full statehood to autonomy in some areas of competence 
within a state system.53 
In international instruments, the language of self-determination is often coupled with that of 
either sovereignty or human rights, thus indicating a versatility to the self-determination concept in 
that it encompasses both group and individual needs and both political and apolitical contexts.54 
This versatility, while promising for its potential to allow the concept of self-determination to 
transcend the limitations of other concepts in its application to indigenous peoples interests, actually 
has diminished the term=s utility, as the level of self-sufficiency implied by the term ranges from an 
outright right of secession to a mere right to co-exist with non-indigenous citizens of an existing 
state.55 These extremes have caused both existing states and indigenous peoples to mistrust the term 
 
53 See Iorns, supra note 2, at 225. 
54 See id. at 203 (positing that Ait is the concept of sovereignty, as presently understood and applied by states, 
that poses the ultimate barrier B that no right of self-determination is recognized in international law where it clashes with 
the world system of state sovereignty@). 
See also ANAYA, supra note 33, at 6-7: 
[A] common tendency has been to understand self-determination as wedded to attributes of statehood, 
with Afull@ self-determination deemed to be in the attainment of independent statehood. 
. . . .
An alternative understanding of self-determination . . . [bases it upon] core values of freedom 
and equality that are relevant to all segments of humanity, including indigenous peoples, in relation to 
the political, economic, and social configurations with which they live.  Under a human rights 
approach, attributes of statehood or sovereignty are at most instrumental to the realization of these 
values B they are not themselves the essence of self-determination. 
See also Brad R. Roth, The Enduring Significance of State Sovereignty, 56 FLA. L. REV. 1017, 1023 (2004):  
ASovereignty is a legal attribute of a territorially bounded political community enjoying full membership in the 
international system. . . . Statehood is conceptualized as consummating the self-determination of a >people.=@ Id. at 1042: 
AOne could go so far as to say that sovereignty, as the consummation of the self-determination of peoples, is not only 
itself a human rights, but indeed . . . the first human right (in the sense of providing a foundation for, not morally 
outweighing, other human rights).@
55 See Iorns, supra note 2, at 209-22: (discussing the debate on the meaning of self-determination, ranging from 
existing states= fear that it carries with it the implication of a right to secession, to the indigenous peoples= concern that it 
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and debate at length over its use in international instruments.56 Even worse, the term has been 
manipulated to the point of near-incoherence; as one commentator noted, A[i]n its present form, . . . 
self-determination lacks both definition and applicability.@57 
In spite of its propensity to generate dissension and even incomprehension, the concept and 
language of self-determination remain prominent in the international vernacular, and thus its unique 
essence B that which may be detected to dwell within its conceptual overlay with sovereignty and 
human rights B is worth identifying.58 That essence, plainly stated, is that culturally distinct groups 
should be free to define and pursue their own destinies, including both whether and how to evolve 
from an identified set of historically distinguishing lifestyle patterns, as well as whether and how to 
 
may be qualified to the point where it only encompasses the relationship between an indigenous people and the State in 
which they live). 
56 Id. See also id. at 224-34 (presenting the state-endorsed positivist view of international law, under which 
states bear the power to determine the range and scope of international law, and the natural law approach to international 
law, generally endorsed by indigenous peoples, under which all indigenous peoples= inherent right to self-determination  
compels its recognition by states). 
See also Gerry J. Simpson, The Diffusion of Sovereignty: Self-determination in the Postcolonial Age, 32 STAN.
J. INT=L L. 255, 255 (1996): A[I]nternational lawyers manipulate a discourse gone dead in their hands: the language of 
self-determination.  A failure to recuperate the law of self-determination will consign this legal principle to the margins of 
the new global disorder.@
See also Kingsbury, supra note 46, at 216: ANegotiations on international normative instruments relating to 
indigenous peoples repeatedly have become ensnarled in the question of whether the international law of self-
determination applies to indigenous peoples.@
57 See Simpson, supra note 55, at 260 (discussing the Ainternal conflict between state rights to self-
determination, and the rights of minorities within states to dismember or challenge the state in the name of another 
competing norm of self-determination@).  See also id. at 261: AIn both concept and practice, then, self-determination is an 
inherently unstable principle.@ Id. at 271-74: (discussing self-determination in the decolonization context and concluding 
that A[d]uring this period, then, self-determination was transformed from a potentially revolutionary and flexible 
democratic ideal into a narrowly conceived imperative, applicable only to anti-colonial efforts.@). 
See also Kingsbury, supra note 46, at 217: 
Self-determination has long b een a conceptual morass in international law, partly because its 
application and meaning have not been formulated fully in agreed texts, partly because it reinforces 
and conflicts with other important principles and specific rules, and partly because the specific 
international law practice of self-determination does not measure up very well to some of the 
established textual formulations.  The standard international law of self-determination accords to the 
people of certain territorially-defined units the rights to determine the political future of the territory.  
58 Kingsbury, supra note 46, at 258: AThe right to self-determination is invoked in international law more often 
than any other collective human right.  It enjoys greater public and institutional recognition than either the right to 
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interact with nonmembers.59 Another way of stating this definition of self-determination is that it 
stands for the rejection of force and other aggressive actions or policies on the part of dominant 
cultures (usually governments) that have as their goal the assimilation, removal, annihilation or even 
the developmental aid of indigenous peoples, where development equals the acquisition of the 
dominant culture=s lifestyle. 
This somewhat narrow definition, which neither includes nor rejects the idea of secession, 
bases an indigenous people=s right to self-determination on the people=s right to and need for cultural 
autonomy, a goal that may be perceived as woefully unambitious from the perspective of those who 
advocate for indigenous peoples= full political independence.60 Nevertheless, the above-stated 
definition of self-determination, in contrast to those of sovereignty and human rights offered above, 
may readily be perceived as encompassing, among its goals, the protection of an indigenous peoples=
relationships with the environment.  Indeed, the more an indigenous peoples= lifestyle or heritage 
may be shown to be based on its association with a land area, a sustenance pattern involving fishing 
or hunting, or some other nature-focused life pattern, the more such an element of their culture would 
seem to fall among the protections offered under the rubric of self-determination.  This would seem 
particularly true where an indigenous population=s environment-related heritage or culture differs 
 
development or the right to natural resources.@
59 See Araujo, supra note 21, at 1492-93:  A[Self-determination] is a notion that brings together the interests of 
the individual and relates them to the interests of the group.  The interests of both the individual and the group 
concentrate on the ability to exercise their selections about how they wish to live their lives and to be free from the 
interference and imposition of others.@
See also Anaya, supra note 5, at 50: 
Although there is a good deal of debate concerning the precise scope and meaning of self-
determination, it is possible to identify a central concept that is widely accepted in international 
discourse.  That is the idea the human beings, individually and collectively, should be in control of 
their own destinies and that the structures of government should be devised accordingly. 
60 See, however, Iorns, supra note 2, at 227 (discerning in the rhetoric of autonomy the implication that it will 
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sharply from that of the dominant culture under whose authority the indigenous population resides. 
 
lead to complete independence, Aeven if it is only achieved in graduated stages@). 
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The definition of self-determination offered above also allows for an indigenous peoples=
evolution to include their naturally assimilating elements of other cultures without losing the 
protections of instruments devoted to protecting their right to autonomous recognition.61 Any 
indigenous community=s cultural evolution is bound to include the acquisition of knowledge, 
technology, and lifestyle patterns of other cultures with which the community=s members find 
themselves in steady contact, particularly where such other cultures have set out to dominate the 
indigenous community and in so doing have introduced political and economic systems under which 
indigenous groups are impoverished, and, perhaps most significantly, ravaged the environment upon 
which the indigenous group subsists through pollution, natural resource extraction, or hunting and 
grazing practices.  If the intermingling of dominant and indigenous lifestyles is perceived as the 
indigenous peoples= relinquishment of their cultural identity, then most if not all indigenous peoples 
are doomed to extinction.  If, however, an indigenous peoples= intermingling with a dominant people 
is perceived to be a feature of the indigenous peoples= own cultural evolution, then the indigenous 
peoples remains intact and worthy of the international community=s protection.  Self-determination, 
when accepted literally, encompasses the idea that an indigenous people might evolve from its 
ancestral life patterns by choice even as it retains the right to recognition and protection as a distinct 
entity with the power to determine its own cultural future. 
II. International Instruments Addressing Indigenous Peoples= Environmental 
Rights: Evolving Rhetorical Ideals 
 
The majority of existing international instruments have failed to provide a supportive 
legal environment for local resource dependent populations that would enable these 
 
61 See Anaya, supra note 5, at 13 (observing that indigenous peoples Ahave survived as they have striven to 
maintain the cultural integrity that makes them different, while adapting, often ingeniously, to the changing conditions 
around them@). 
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populations to manage in a sustainable manner forests and other components of 
biodiversity which they utilize or over which they exercise effective control.62 
The recent surge of widespread sensitivity to the unique needs of indigenous peoples in a 
world characterized by conquest and forced assimilation has taken a number of legal and quasi-legal 
forms.  International organizations and individual governments have produced a new generation of 
documents C conventions, declarations, constitutional provisions, statutes, treaties, policies, and 
reports C that share the rhetoric of empowerment, protection, and environmental rights for the 
indigenous cultures that have been historically weakened by the integrationist policies of the non-
indigenous governments that invade or colonize, dominate, and come to represent the mainstream.63 
The following sections of this Article offer a chronology of international instruments reflecting the 
global community=s slow-growing acknowledgment of indigenous populations as necessary 
recipients of international concern, then outlines a few of the most significant of the more recent 
among these documents, with its focus on provisions that address the symbiotic connection between 
indigenous communities and the land and other attributes of the natural environment.  As this survey 
demonstrates, the trend in international instruments has been toward more direct and open assertions 
of the cultural significance and vulnerability of indigenous tribes.  This survey also demonstrates that 
such instruments still tend to fall short of asserting substantive legal rights that indigenous tribes or 
members may utilize to effectively protect a tribe=s cultural integrity against opposing governmental 
 
62 Gregory F. Maggio, Recognizing the Vital Role of Local Communities in International Legal Instruments for 
Conserving Biodiversity, 16 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL=Y 179, 179-80 (1997-1998). 
63 For a detailed discussion of the historical evolution of indigenous peoples= rights in the international arena, see 
Russell L. Barsh, Indigenous Peoples: An Emerging Object of International Law, 80 AM. J. INT=L L. 649 (1988). 
For a discussion of this evolution in connection with Native American tribes in the United States, see Allison M. 
Dussias, Geographically-based and Membership-based Views of Indian Tribal Sovereignty: The Supreme Court=s
Changing Vision, 55 PITT. L. REV. 1 (1993) (analyzing historical developments and set-backs in the U.S. Supreme 
Court=s sensitivity to the primacy of territorial authority in connection with tribal sovereignty).  
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or private interests. 
A. Early International and Regional Statements on Human Rights 
International rules are, in most cases, strikingly vague, permitting a scale of possible 
degrees of implementation.64 
The 1945 Charter of the United Nations65 and the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights66 both focus on means of securing and preserving fundamental human rights.  Signatories of 
the U.N. Charter dedicated themselves to the Athe principle of equal rights and self-determination of 
peoples,@67 as well as to Afundamental freedom for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or 
religion.@68 As one commentator has noted, however, A[i]t is a measure of how insignificant self-
determination was thought to be by the drafters of the Charter that it appears only twice in the whole 
document.@69 The Universal Declaration, without mentioning self-determination at all, expresses the 
need for member states to secure the fundamental human rights of Athe peoples of territories under 
their jurisdiction.@70 Thus, the U.N. Charter and Universal Declaration set the foundation for U.N. 
 
64 ANTHANASIA SPILIOPOULOU AKERMARK, JUSTIFICATIONS OF MINORITY PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
17 (Kluwer Law International, 1997). 
65 UNITED NATIONS CHARTER, 1 U.N.T.S. xvi (1945).  The Charter entered into force on October 24, 1945, and 
was ratified by the United States on that date.  59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993, 3 Bevans 1153, 1976 Y.B.U.N. 1043. 
66 UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, U.N.G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948). 
67 UNITED NATIONS CHARTER, supra note 65, at Art. 1(2):  AThe Purposes of the United Nations are: . . . To 
develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of 
peoples.@ See also id. at Art. 55. 
68 Id. at Arts. 1(3), 13(1)(b), 55(c), 62(2), 76(c).  
69 See Simpson, supra note 57, at 266. 
70 UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 66, Preamble: 
The General Assembly 
Proclaims this Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a common standard of achievement 
for all peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual and every organ of society . . . shall 
strive . . . to promote respect for [human] rights and freedoms and . . . secure their universal and 
effective recognition and observance, both among the peoples of Member States themselves and 
among the peoples of territories under their jurisdiction. 
The Declaration goes on to underscore that: Ano distinction shall be made [as to the entitlement of all to human 
rights and freedoms] on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which 
a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty.@ Id.
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member states to recognize the rights Anot merely of minorities but of indigenous peoples.@71 Neither 
document, however, expressly focuses on the significance of the environment in indigenous peoples=
cultural traditions or makes the self-determination of such peoples its primary goal. 
Similarly, regional human rights instruments of the mid-twentieth century contain only scant, 
indirect references to environmental interests, and reflect little if any recognition of the unique 
position of indigenous peoples vis a vis land and natural resources.  The American Declaration of the 
Rights and Duties of Man, promulgated in 1948, makes its primary focus the individual=s right to 
spiritual and cultural development.72 Various articles of the American Declaration address the rights 
of all individuals to practice a faith, move freely within one=s homeland, enjoy healthy living 
conditions, participate in artistic and scientific discovery, and own property.73 Certainly the 
Preamble to the American Declaration links the freedom of the individual with that of the collective, 
observing that A[t]he fulfillment of duty by each individual is a prerequisite to the rights of all.@74 
at art. 2. 
71 AKERMARK, supra note 64, at 21: 
[T]here exists a grey area between what is a >minority= and what is an >indigenous people.= An element 
which is strong in the international discourse concerning indigenous peoples is that of restitution for 
past grievances, an element which is not as central in the discourse concerning minorities. 
72 ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, AMERICAN 
DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF MAN (1948), at Preamble (identifying spiritual development as Athe 
supreme end of human existence@ and culture as Athe highest social and historical expression of that spiritual 
development@). 
73 See id. at Art. III (AEvery person has the right freely to profess a religious faith, and to manifest and practice it 
both in public and in private.@); Art. VIII (AEvery person has the right to fix his residence within the territory of the state 
of which he is a national, to move about freely within such territory, and not to leave it except by his own will.@); Art. XI 
(AEvery person has the right to the preservation of his health through sanitary and social measures relating to food, 
clothing, housing and medical care, to the extent permitted by pubic and community resources.@); Art. XIII (AEvery 
person has the right to take part in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts, and to participate in the benefits 
that result from intellectual progress, especially scientific discoveries.@); and Art. XXIII (AEvery person has a right to own 
such private property as meets the essential needs of decent living and helps to maintain the dignity of the individual and 
of the home.@).  Such rights, presented in a single instrument, serve as a statement of the essential elements of cultural 
survival. 
74 Id. at Preamble.  See also id. (identifying Aspiritual development@ as Athe supreme end of human existence@
and Aculture@ as Athe highest social and historical expression of that spiritual development@). 
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Still, the Declaration contains no language explicitly addressing the communal nature of indigenous 
communities= interests in territory and natural resources; nor does it directly acknowledge the 
sensitive relationship between indigenous cultural survival and the environment.  In short, a 
straightforward reading of the American Declaration is that it aims to treat all persons and all 
cultures as identical and thus as able to thrive when endowed with the rights and freedoms of the 
dominant culture.75 
The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
first promulgated in 1950, addresses human rights and fundamental freedoms from a distinctly 
individualistic perspective, with almost all of its articles asserting the equal rights of every person.76 
Even as amended through 1985, the European Convention contains only scant and indirect references 
to community rights or environmental rights, and those in forms common to dominant democratic 
cultures.  Environmental rights, for example, are limited to the property-related privacy  interest an 
individual holds in his home.77 Collective cultural rights include only the individual=s freedom of 
 
75 That the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man presumes that all persons and cultures will 
thrive when endowed with  rights essential to members of the dominant culture may be best demonstrated in articles that 
aim to provide individuals with the means to thrive within the dominant culture.  See, e.g., AMERICAN DECLARATION ON 
THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF MAN, supra note 72, at Art. XII (A[E]very person has the right to an education that will 
prepare him to attain a decent life, to raise his standard of living, and to be a useful member of society.  The right to an 
education includes the right to equality of opportunity in every case, in accordance with natural talents, merit and the 
desire to utilize the resources that the state or the community is in a position to provide.@); Art. XIII (AEvery person has 
the right to . . . participate in the benefits that result from intellectual progress, especially scientific discoveries.@).   
76 See COUNCIL OF EUROPE, EUROPEAN CONVENTION FOR PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL 
FREEDOMS Art. 2 (addressing the individual=s right to life); Art. 3 (addressing the individual=s right against inhuman 
treatment); Art. 4 (addressing the individual=s right against slavery and compulsory labor); Art. 5 (addressing the 
individual=s right to liberty and security of person); Art. 6 (addressing the individual=s right to a fair and public hearing); 
Art. 7 (addressing the individual=s right against ex post facto laws); Art. 8 (addressing the individual=s right to privacy); 
Art. 9 (addressing the individual=s right to freedom of thought and religion); Art. 10 (addressing the individual=s right to 
freedom of expression); Art. 11 (addressing the collective right to assemble and the individual=s right of association); Art. 
12 (addressing the individual=s right to marry); Art. 13 (addressing the individual=s right to seek effective remedy against 
breach of his or her rights). 
77 Id. at Art. 8 (addressing every man=s Aright to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
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religion and the freedom of peaceful assembly and association.78 No language asserting these or 
other rights addresses them in the context of indigenous communities. 
1. The Goal of Assimilation 
In 1957, the International Labor Organization (AILO@) adopted Convention 107 Concerning 
the Protection and Integration of Indigenous and other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in 
Independent Countries.79 ILO Convention 107 acknowledges, Afor the first time in international 
law,@80 the existence and disadvantaged status of indigenous peoples,81 and demands that 
governments within whose borders tribal populations dwell take actions to protect and enable them.82 
Reflecting the dominant sentiment of the mid-twentieth century, ILO Convention 107 promotes non-
 
correspondence,@ and also barring governmental interference with these rights except when Anecessary in a democratic 
society in the interests of . . . public safety or . . . for the protection of public health . . .@).   
78 Id. at Art. 9 (addressing the individual=s Afreedom of thought, conscience and religion,@ including the right to 
change religions Ain community with others . . .@); Art. 11(addressing the individual=s right Aof peaceful assembly and to 
freedom of association with others . . .@) Neither of these passages indicates that they are meant to apply to the unique 
situation of indigenous peoples; the right to assemble, in fact, offers Athe right to form and to join trade unions@ as its 
example of the types of assemblies it protects). 
79 INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION  CONVENTION 107 CONCERNING THE PROTECTION AND INTEGRATION 
OF INDIGENOUS AND OTHER TRIBAL AND SEMI-TRIBAL POPULATIONS IN INDEPENDENT COUNTRIES, 328 U.N.T.S. 247 
(1957). 
80 Paul Havemann, Twentieth-Century Public International Law and Indigenous Peoples, in PAUL HAVEMANN,
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES=RIGHTS IN AUSTRALIA, CANADA, & NEW ZEALAND (1999), at 19: AILO Convention No. 107 . . . is 
expressed primarily in terms of the equal rights of individual members of indigenous populations.  But it secondarily 
includes, for the first time in international law, recognition of indigenous peoples or groups, although still in the 
framework of integrative or assimilationist national regimes.@
81 I.L.O. CONVENTION 107, supra note 79, at Art. 1, defining indigenous peoples as tribal populations Awhose 
social and economic conditions are at a less advanced stage than the stage reached by the other sections of the national 
community, and whose status is regulated wholly or partially by their own customs or traditions or by special laws or 
regulations,@ and also members of tribes: 
regarded as indigenous on account of their descent from the populations which inhabited the country . . 
. at the time of conquest of colonisation and which, irrespective of their legal status, live more in 
conformity with the social, economic and cultural institutions of that time than with the institutions of 
the nation to which they belong. 
Id. at Art. 1(a), (b). 
82 Id. at Art. 2(2)(a), (b), and (c), listing equal access to rights and opportunities enjoyed by the non-indigenous 
population; social, cultural, and economic development; and opportunities for integration as three elements that must be 
included in each member state=s action plan for its indigenous populations.  
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coercive assimilation as a means of providing social and economic equality to tribal populations.83 
In doing so, however, the document does express sensitivity to the customs and social institutions of 
such populations, including their relationship to the land.84 Article 11, for example, orders 
governments to recognize members of indigenous tribes as holding both individual and collective 
rights of ownership over their traditionally occupied lands.85 Article 12 warns assimilating 
governments against removing tribes from their habitual territories without their consent, although it 
undermines this protective sentiment with  exceptions that include the acknowledgment that a state 
might remove a tribe from its territory Ain the interest of national economic development.@86 
In keeping with this approach, the 1962 Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural 
Resources proclaims the sovereignty of states over natural resources within their borders.87 
Although the Resolution acknowledges A[t]he right of peoples . . . to permanent sovereignty over 
their natural wealth and resources,@ it demands that such sovereignty Abe exercises in the interest of . 
 
83 Id. at Art. 2(2)(c). 
84 The Convention urges all governments to create Apossibilities@ for integration and to avoid Athe artificial 
assimilation of these populations.@ Id. Next, the Convention points out that the Aprimary objective of all such 
[assimilative] action shall be the fostering of individual dignity, and the advancement of individual usefulness and 
initiative.@ Id. at Art. 2(3).  Article 2(4) states even more directly that A[r]ecourse to force or coercion as a means of 
promoting the integration of these populations into the national community shall be excluded.@ Id. at Art. 2(4).  Article 4 
addresses the need for the integrationist government to respect the cultural and religious values as well as the forms of 
social control existing within a tribe, and Article 5 addresses the need to allow tribes undergoing integration to participate 
in the evolution of their culture.  Id. at Art. 5, 6.  Articles 7 and 8 advise assimilating states to preserve the customary 
laws, penal systems, and institutions of assimilated tribes whenever possible.        
85 Id. at Art. 11. 
86 Id. at Art. 12(1): AThe populations . . . shall not be removed without their free consent from their habitual 
territories except in accordance with national laws and regulations for reasons relating to national security, or in the 
interest of national economic development or of the health of said populations.@ Article 12(2) and (3) cover 
compensation for removed tribes, and Article 13 charges states with the duty to oversee the procedure for transferring 
rights of ownership to tribes and to protect them from persons who would take advantage of their customs or lack of 
understanding of property laws. Id. at arts. 12(2), (3), 13(1), (2).  
87 RESOLUTION ON PERMANENT SOVEREIGNTY OVER NATURAL RESOURCES, U.N.G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), 17 
U.N. GAOR. Supp. (No. 17) 15, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1963). 
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. . national development and of the well-being of the people of the State concerned.@88 Thus, like 
ILO Convention 107, the 1962 Resolution recognizes tribal sovereignty, then immediately undercuts 
it in favor of national sovereignty over indigenous lands and natural resources, allowing states the 
broad latitude to take such resources on grounds of Anational interest.@89 
In the mid-1960's the United Nations General Assembly produced three important treaties 
addressing human rights:  the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (AICEFRD@),90 the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (AICCPR@),91 
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (AICESCR@).92 These 
documents echo rights identified in the Universal Declaration, giving legal effect to those rights and 
setting forth measures that nation states must take to effect them.93 
The ICEFRD condemns discrimination against groups of persons, and defines civil rights to 
include the right to own property both individually and collectively.94 Its primary goal, however, is 
to encourage parity between individuals of all races, and thus it urges states to Adiscourage anything 
which tends to strengthen racial divisions,@ a directive which could conceivably justify the 
 
88 Id. at I (1).  See also id. at I (5): A[T]he free and beneficial exercise of the sovereignty of peoples and nations 
over their natural resources must be furthered by the mutual respect of States based on their sovereign equality.@ The 
provision references the sovereignty of peoples over natural resources, but refrains from including peoples in its 
statement of sovereign equality. 
89 See id. at I (4):   ANationalization, expropriation or requisitioning shall be based on grounds or reasons of 
public utility, security or the national interest which are recognized as overriding purely individual or private interests, 
both domestic and foreign.@
90 INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION, Dec. 21, 
1965, 5 I.L.M. 350 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969), 660 U.N.T.S. 195. 
91 INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, Dec. 16, 1966, 6 I.L.M. 368 (entered into force 
Mar. 23, 1976),U.N.G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966). 
92 INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS, Dec. 16, 1966, 6 I.L.M. 360 
(entered into force Jan. 3, 1976), U.N.G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 
(1966). 
93 See Caroline Dommen, Claiming Environmental Rights: Some Possibilities Offered by the United Nations=
Human Rights Mechanisms, 11 GEO. INT=L ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 6 (1998). 
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programmatic encouragement of assimilation and other efforts to erase the cultural connection 
between an indigenous community and its territory or natural resources.95 
The ICCPR differs from the ICEFRD in that it directly addresses the rights of all peoples to 
self-determination, defined as the right to Afreely determine their political status and freely pursue 
their economic, social and cultural development.@96 In keeping with this, Article 27 of the ICCPR 
declares that individuals belonging to ethnic, religious, or linguistic minorities Ashall not be denied 
the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess 
and practise their own religion, or to use their own language.@97 Significantly, the General 
Comments on Article 27 point out that a minority group=s right to enjoy its own culture may involve 
a lifestyle for which a territory and the use of natural resources are key factors, and that this is 
particularly likely in the case of indigenous peoples.98 Like the ICEFRD, however, the ICCPR 
makes its primary focus first generation rights, or the rights of all individuals to humane and equal 
treatment by the state and under its laws.99 Although Article 1 references both group identities and 
natural resources in its assertion that A[i]n no case may a people be deprived of its own means of 
subsistence,@100 only Article 47 expressly references a peoples= inherent right Ato enjoy and utilize 
fully and freely their natural wealth and resources,@ and this only in the context of an assurance that 
 
94 ICEFRC, supra note 90, at Art. 2(1)(a) and Art. 5(d)(v). 
95 See id. at Art. 2(1)(e), ordering states Ato encourage . . . integrationist multi-racial organizations and 
movements and other means of eliminating barriers between races, and to discourage anything which tends to strengthen 
racial division.@
96 ICCPR, supra note 91, at Art. 1(1). 
97 Id. at Art. 27. 
98 See AKERMARK, supra note 64, at 82. 
99 The majority of the ICCPR covers legal rights associated with arrest, punishment, and process, the right to 
life, rights against slavery, the rights of persons incarcerated, rights associated with thought, conscience and religion, 
freedom of association and familial rights. ICCPR, supra note 91, at Arts. 2-27.   
100 Id. at Art. 1(2). 
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the rest of the ICCPR does not impair such inherent rights.101 
The ICESCR, unlike the ICEFRD and the ICCPR, addresses second generation rights, 
including the rights of a people to freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.102 
Such rights are almost universally more directly associated with an indigenous people=s relationship 
with the environment than first generation rights, as they focus on rights associated with property 
transactions, agriculture, and religious expression rather than the basic rights to life, physical liberty, 
and freedom from persecution.103 The ICESCR addresses rights associated with employment, food 
production, healthcare, education, and participation in the scientific, artistic, and intellectual 
community.104 Like the ICEFRD and the ICCPR, the focus is on the states creating opportunities for 
indigenous populations to evolve in cultural patterns similar to those of the dominant culture.  
Nowhere does the ICESCR address means through which traditional territories or natural resources 
may be preserved or protected for an indigenous people=s cultural use. 
On the regional level, the American Convention on Human Rights, echoing the international 
instruments being drafted in the late 1960's, set as its goal the wedding of the principles of human 
rights set forth in the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, and the protections found in the domestic laws of the various 
American nations, among other sources.105 Addressing its protections to all individuals, the 
 
101 Id. at Art. 47. 
102 ICESCR, supra note 92. 
103 The ICCPR and the ICESCR, along with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, are often referenced 
collectively as the International Bill of Human Rights. See Watters, supra note 10, at 265, citing JACK DONNELLY,
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 10 (1993) (describing the International Bill of Human Rights as Apresent[ing] a summary 
statement of the minimum social and political guarantees internationally recognized as necessary for a life of dignity in 
the contemporary world@). 
104 ICESCR, supra note 92, at Arts. 6-15. 
105 AMERICAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS APACT OF SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA,@O.A.S.Treaty Series No. 36, 
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American Convention was a pact among its signatory nations to adopt legislation and institute other 
means through which their domestic laws could give effect to the Convention=s list of individual 
rights and freedoms.106 These included a litany of civil and political rights, including, for example, 
the right to recognition as a person under the law, the right to humane treatment, the right to live free 
from involuntary servitude, and the right to a fair trial.107 Rights that could encompass indigenous 
communities= environmental interests include those addressing honor and dignity, religion, thought 
and expression, association, property and residence.108 None of the provisions addressing rights that 
might include the interests that indigenous peoples have in their historical territories and natural 
resources appear to contemplate their potential applicability to such environmental interests; in fact, 
language in Article 22 barring collective expulsion from a territory addresses only A[t]he collective 
expulsion of aliens.@109 Thus, although the American Convention did not come into effect until 
1978, it reflects the non-environmental focus of its late 1960's drafting date.  
Finally, in 1970, the U.N. General Assembly produced the Declaration on Principles of 
 
1144 U.N.T.S. 123 entered into force July 18, 1978, at Preamble. 
106 Id. at Art. 2. 
107 See id. at Art. 3 (addressing the right to juridical personality); Art. 4 (addressing the right to life and 
encouraging the abolishment of the death penalty in signatory states); Art. 5 (addressing the right to humane treatment, 
including the banning of torture and the humane treatment of persons accused of crime); Art. 6 (addressing the right to 
live free from slavery or involuntary servitude, excepting the punishment of forced labor as a penalty for certain crimes); 
Art. 7 (addressing the right to personal liberty and security, and banning arbitrary arrest or imprisonment); Art. 8 
(addressing the right to fair trial); Art. 9 (banning ex post facto laws); Art. 10 (addressing the right to compensation in the 
instance of a miscarriage of justice). 
108 See id. at Art. 11 (addressing the right to privacy, including the right to honor, dignity, and freedom from 
interference in one=s private life, family life and home); Art. 12 (addressing religious freedom); Art. 13 (addressing 
freedom of thought and expression); Art. 16 (addressing the right to associate freely for ideological, religious, political, 
cultural or other purposes); Art. 20 (addressing the right to a nationality); Art. 21 (addressing the right to property); Art. 
22 (addressing the right against expulsion from the territory of one=s state); Art. 24 (addressing the right to equal 
protection under the law).    
109 Id. at Art. 22(9): AThe collective expulsion of aliens is prohibited.@ Articles 22(5) and (6), addressing 
expulsion from a state=s territory, are drafted in simple terms that do not appear to contemplate the circumstance in which 
an indigenous nation exists within the territory of a nation state. 
31 
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance 
with the Charter of the United Nations.110 This powerfully worded instrument, in which the General 
Assembly declared itself to be reaffirming and explaining the scope and import of the U.N. 
Charter,111 directly charges nations with the duty to promote self-determination of peoples in the 
areas of economic, social, and cultural development.112 Although primarily aimed at relationships 
between nations, the Declaration contains strong language on the rights of peoples to self-
determination: 
Every State has the duty to promote . . . the realization of the principle of equal rights 
and self-determination of peoples, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter, 
and to render assistance to the United Nations in carrying out the responsibilities 
entrusted to it by the Charter regarding the implementation of the principle in order: 
. . . .
(b) to bring speedy end to colonization, having due regard to the freely expressed will 
of the peoples concerned; 
 
and bearing in mind that subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and 
exploitation constitutes a violation of the principle, as well as a denial of fundamental 
human rights, and is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations.113 
Direct as this passage is in its condemnation of forced assimilation and in its identification of the 
duty to protect indigenous cultures as a primary obligations of U.N. Charter signatories, the language 
of the 1970 Declaration never connects self-determination and indigenous cultural survival with 
 
110 DECLARATION ON PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW CONCERNING FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND CO-
OPERATION AMONG STATES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, U.N.G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV) 
25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 28) 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971). 
111 See id. at Preamble. 
112 Id. at para. 35: 
By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples enshrined in the Charter, all 
peoples have the right freely to determine, without external interference, their political status and to 
pursue their economic, social and cultural development, and every States has the duty to respect this 
right in accordance with the provisions of the Charter. 
113 Id. at para. 36.  See also id. at para. 37: AEvery State has the duty to promote through joint and separate 
action universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms in accordance with the Charter.@
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sovereignty over traditional territories and their natural resources.  Express recognition of the 
environment-related needs of indigenous peoples is left to later instruments.  
2. Emerging Acknowledgments of the Environment as Central to Indigenous 
Culture 
The early 1970's saw the emergence of several important international documents addressing 
mankind=s environmental rights and responsibilities.  In 1972, the United Nations Conference on the 
Human Environment produced the Stockholm Declaration.114 A short, often passionate series of 
statements on the obligations of a technologically advanced world population to control both 
pollution and resource exploitation,115 the Stockholm Declaration calls on both industrialized and 
developing states to acknowledge and meet the challenges of environmentalism in a world that still 
requires much development.116 Unlike many of its predecessors, the Stockholm Declaration 
expressly addresses the link between the environment and human rights, stating in its opening 
proclamation that A[b]oth aspects of man=s environment, the natural and the man-made, are essential 
to his well-being and to the enjoyment of basic human right.@117 It also reveals an awareness of tribal 
communities and their need for protection against dominators, speaking to Acommunities@ and 
 
114 STOCKHOLM DECLARATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT, Report of 
the U.N. Conference on the Human, Environment, Stockholm, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 48/14 (1972).  The 1972 Conference 
on the Human Environment produced two additional important creations: the Stockholm Action Plan, which set forth 
recommendations for environmental management on the international level, and the United Nations Environment 
Programme, the United Nations organ for environmental issues.  See Dena Marshall, Note: An Organization for the 
World Environment: Three Models and Analysis, 15 GEO. INT=L L. REV. 79, 81-2 (2002). 
115 STOCKHOLM DECLARATION, supra note 114,  at I (1): AMan is both creature and moulder of his environment 
. . . . [T]hrough the rapid acceleration of science and technology, man has acquired the power to transform his 
environment in countless ways and on an unprecedented scale.@
116 See, e.g., id. at I (3): AIn our time, man=s capability to transform his surroundings, if used wisely, can bring to 
all peoples the benefits of development and the opportunity to enhance the quality of life.@
117 Id. at I (1).  See also id. at I (2): AThe protection and improvement of the human environment is a major issue 
which affects the well-being of peoples and economic development throughout the world: it is the urgent desire of the 
peoples of the whole world and the duty of all Governments.@
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Apeoples@ who Aby their values and the sum of their actions, will shape the world environment of the 
future,@118 and calling for the abandonment of Aprojects which are designed for colonialist and racist 
domination.@119 
Still, the essential focus of the Stockholm Declaration is on governments, both industrial and 
developing, and its core message is that less developed communities must be aided so that they may 
acquire the economic and social advancements of more developed countries.120 As one commentator 
summarized the instrument: 
The most important customary principle of international environmental law, best 
known as Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration, stipulates that states have Athe 
sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental 
policies,@ as long as they do not thereby Acause damage to the environment of other 
states or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.@ The result is that 
citizens facing locally generated or locally tolerated environmental threats can, with 
 
118 Id. at I (7), calling upon AGovernments and peoples to exert common efforts for the preservation and 
improvement of the human environment, for the benefit of all the people and for their posterity.@
119 Id. at II (15), warning that APlanning must be applied to human settlements and urbanization with a view to 
avoiding adverse effects on the environment and obtaining maximum social, economic, and environmental benefits for 
all.@
120 See, e.g., id. at I (4): AIn the developing countries most of the environmental problems are caused by under-
development. . . . [T]he industrialized countries should make efforts to reduce the gap between themselves and the 
developing countries.@ See also id. at II (8): AEconomic and social development is essential for ensuring a favourable 
living and working environment for man and for creating conditions on earth that are necessary for the improvement of 
the quality of life.@ See also id. at II (9): AEnvironmental deficiencies generated by the conditions of underdevelopment . 
. . can best be remedied by accelerated development through the transfer of substantial quantities of financial and 
technological assistance as a supplement to the domestic efforts of the developing countries . . .@
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very rare exceptions, only rely on national laws for protection.121 
In short, the cultural sensitivity exhibited in the Stockholm Declaration is undermined by its 
adherence to the non-interventionist code of sovereignty.  Additionally, although the Declaration 
demonstrates a global awareness of the symbiosis between indigenous cultures and the environment, 
 there is no language in the Declaration about preserving or emulating the cultural values or lifestyles 
of those peoples who live lightly on the land.    
 
121 See Dommen, supra note 93, at 2. 
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In 1973, the General Assembly adopted a second Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over 
Natural Resources.122 Ten years after its first Resolution relied on the discretion of individual nation 
states to determine the balance between indigenous and national sovereignty over tribal territories 
and their natural resources,123 in 1973 the General Assembly directly addressed the treatment of 
indigenous peoples and their natural resources by states.124 The 1973 Resolution not only deplores 
state uses of Aforce, armed aggression, economic coercion or any other illegal or improper means in 
resolving disputes concerning the exercise of . . . sovereign rights,@125 but also contains a stern 
reminder on the treatment of indigenous peoples as nations as dictated by a litany of U.N. 
conventions:126 
The General Assembly, 
 
Re-emphasizes that actions, measures or legislative regulations by States aimed at 
coercing, directly or indirectly, . . . peoples engaged in the . . . exercise of their 
sovereign rights over their natural resources, both on land and in their coastal waters, 
are in violation of the Charter of the United Nations and of the Declaration contained 
in General Assembly resolution 25 (XXV) . . . and that to persist therein could 
constitute a threat to international peace and security127 
In so stating, the 1973 Resolution not only reflects a formal recognition of the interconnectedness 
among a peoples= culture, its natural environment, and self-determination, but also documents the 
international community=s growing awareness of the fact that questions of indigenous peoples=
sovereignty over land and natural resources may not be handled in a manner consistent with 
 
122 RESOLUTION ON PERMANENT SOVEREIGNTY OVER NATURAL RESOURCES, U.N.G.A. Res. 3171 (XXVIII); 28 
GAOR. Supp. (No. 30) 52, U.N. Doc. A/9400 (1973). 
123 See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text. 
124 See 1973 RESOLUTION, supra note 122, at Arts. 4-6. 
125 Id. at Art. 4. 
126 Id. at Art. 5. 
127 Id. The Declaration referenced is the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly 
Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, discussed supra note 110 
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international ideals if left to the individual nations in which such environmental resources are found. 
B. Instruments Directly Linking Indigenous Rights and the Environment 
and accompanying text. 
Indigenous peoples are the base of what I guess could be called the environmental 
security system.  We are the gate-keepers of success or failure to husband our 
resources.  For many of us, however, the last few centuries have meant a major loss 
of control over our lands and waters.  We are still the first to know about changes in 
the environment, but we are now the last to be asked or consulted. 
We are the first to detect when the forests are being threatened, as they are 
under the slash and grab economics of this country.  And we are the last to be asked 
about the future of our forests.  We are the first to feel the pollution of our waters, as 
the Ojibway peoples of my own homelands in northern Ontario will attest.  And, of 
course, we are the last to be consulted about how, when, and where developments 
should take place in order to assure continuing harmony for the seventh generation. 
The most we have learned to expect is to be compensated, always too late and 
too little.  We are seldom asked to help avoid the need for compensation by lending 
our expertise and our consent to development. 
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C Louis Bruyere, President, Native Council of Canada128 
International instruments produced during the 1980's reflect an advancement in the global 
acknowledgment of the link between human and cultural rights.  In 1981, for example, the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples= Rights addresses the rights of both individuals and peoples to both 
first and second generation rights.129 This inclusiveness is a conscious goal of the African Charter, 
as is made clear in its preamble, which recognizes the role played by Ahistorical traditions@ in 
inspiring Athe concept of human and peoples= rights,@ then observes that Athe reality and respect of 
peoples[=] rights should necessarily guarantee human rights.@130 The African Charter juxtaposes 
individual and group rights in numerous provisions, recognizing that individual freedom includes 
participation in the cultural life of the community, and that a peoples= right to existence necessitates a 
right to self-determination.131 The African Charter also addresses the importance of peoples=
128 World Commission on Environment and Development Public Hearing, Ottawa, 26-27 May 1986, quoted in 
OUR COMMON FUTURE, Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development, U.N.G.A. A/42/427, 42nd 
Sess., Item 83(e) of the provisional agenda, 87-18467, Supp. 25 (A/42/25) 1987, at ch. 2, p. 61 (Oxford Univ. Press ed., 
1987). 
129 AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES= RIGHTS, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 Rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 59 
(1982).  
130 Id. at Preamble, para. 4, 5: 
The . . . parties to the present convention . . . , 
Tak[e] into consideration the virtues of their historical tradition and the values of African 
civilization which should inspire and characterize their reflection on the concept of human and 
peoples= rights; 
Recogniz[e] on the one hand, that fundamental human rights stem from the attributes of 
human beings, which justifies their national and international protection and on the other hand that the 
reality and respect of peoples[=] rights should necessarily guarantee human rights; 
131 See id. at Art. 17(2), (3) linking individual and group rights: 
2. Every individual may freely[ ] take part in the cultural life of his community. 
3. The promotion and protection of morals and traditional values recognized by the 
community shall be the duty of the State. 
See also id. at Art. 20 (1), addressing first and second generation rights: 
All peoples shall have the right to existence.  They shall have the unquestionable and inalienable right 
to self-determination.  They shall freely determine their political status and shall pursue their economic 
and social development according to the policy they have freely chosen. 
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dominion over property and natural resources.132 However, all language addressing the need for 
territorial dominion and rights over natural resources present these rights as key aspects of a peoples=
ability to develop.133 Like prior conventions, the African Charter never expressly addresses the idea 
of environmental  rights as a means of preserving and honoring a peoples= aboriginal identity. 
The early 1980's also witnessed the emergence of instruments that make their primary focus 
environmental protection and environmental risk analysis in conjunction with development.  In 1982, 
for example, the World Charter for Nature emerged, a document which does, in fact, assert the 
connection between humankind=s well-being and the state of the natural environment, with its 
opening paragraphs acknowledging the human-nature symbiosis on both individual and collective 
levels.134 The World Charter also sets forth a framework for environmentally ethical behavior.135 It 
recognizes the intrinsic value of environmental diversity regardless of its utility to mankind, and 
charges mankind with the duty to protect nature in the face of our ability to destroy it.136 It also 
 
132 See id. at Art. 21(1), (2):  
1.     All peoples shall freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources.  This right shall be 
exercised in the exclusive interest of the people.  In no case shall a people be deprived of it. 
2.     In case of spoliation the dispossessed people shall have the right to the lawful recovery of its 
property as well as to an adequate compensation. 
133 See id. at Art. 24: AAll peoples shall have the right to a general[ly] satisfactory environment favorable to 
their development.@
134 WORLD CHARTER FOR NATURE, U.N.G.A. Res. 37/7, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp. (No. 51) 21, U.N. Doc. 
A/37/L.4 and Add. 1 (1982).  See Preamble, para. 2(a), (b): 
(a)  Mankind is part of nature and life depends on the uninterrupted functioning of natural systems 
which ensure the supply of energy and nutrients. 
(b) Civilization is rooted in nature, which has shaped human culture and influenced all artistic and 
scientific achievement, and living in harmony with nature gives man the best opportunities for the 
development of his creativity, and for rest and recreation 
135 Id. at Preamble, para.3(a), (b): 
(a) Every form of life is unique, warranting respect regardless of its worth to man, and, to accord other 
organisms such recognition, man must be guided by a moral code of action, 
(b) Man can alter nature and exhaust natural resources by his action or its consequences and, therefore, 
must fully recognize the urgency of maintaining the stability and quality of nature and of conserving 
natural resources. 
136 Id.  See also General Principles, at I (1): ANature shall be respected and its essential processes shall not be 
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directs that social and economic development plans take account of environmental impacts and make 
Athe conservation of nature . . . an integral part of [development] activities.@137 Although an 
important document in its linking of development and environmental degradation, the World 
Charter, as its predecessors, does not address the symbiosis between indigenous cultural preservation 
and environmental preservation. 
A third example of international instruments produced in the early to mid-1980's that 
addressed both human and economic rights is the 1986 Declaration on the Right to Development.138 
Although sensitive to the cultural rights of peoples as well as the threats against territorial integrity, 
the 1986 Declaration, like its predecessors, equated self-determination with development, and 
charges individual nations with the right and duty to formulate nation-wide development plans that 
encompass Athe entire population and . . . all individuals.@139 Once again, although the language is 
sensitive to the evils of racism and the plight of territorial populations, the Declaration appears to be 
based on an unspoken philosophy that rights to development bring fundamental equality to all.140 Its 
most direct assertion on environmental rights captures this sentiment, stating that A[t]he human right 
to development also implies the full realization of the right of people to self-determination, which 
 
impaired.@
137 Id. at II (7).  See also II (8), requiring environmental sensitivity in long-range development planning; II (11), 
requiring the use of best available technologies to minimize environmental risks. 
138 DECLARATION ON THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT, U.N.G.A. Res. 41/128, 41 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 53), 
U.N. Doc. A/41/925 (1986). 
139 Id. at Art. 2(3): 
States have the right and the duty to formulate appropriate national development policies that aim at 
the constant improvement of the well-being of the entire population and of all individuals, on the basis 
of their active, free and meaningful participation in the development and in the fair distribution of the 
benefits resulting therefrom. 
140 Id. at Art. 1(1): 
The right to development is an inalienable human right by virtue of which every human person and all 
peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political 
development, in which all human rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully realized. 
40 
includes . . . the exercise of their inalienable right to full sovereignty over all their natural wealth and 
resources.@141 
Finally, in the 1988 Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the 
Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights AProtocol of San Salvador,@ parties to the American 
Convention on Human Rights sought to verify, update and expand upon the provisions of that 
instrument.142 Pertinent to the treatment of indigenous cultures, the Additional Protocol 
acknowledges the holistic interplay between the dignity of the individual and group or cultural 
rights.143 The Additional Protocol also makes express reference to Apeoples,@ declaring their rights to 
Adevelopment, self-determination, and the free disposal of their wealth and natural resources.@144 
Article 5 does admit that states may restrict the human rights asserted throughout the Additional 
Protocol Aby means of laws promulgated for the purpose of preserving the general welfare in a 
democratic society;@145 while Article 11, asserting the governmental need to Apromote the protection, 
preservation, and improvement of the environment,@ offers no elaboration of this oblique 
observation.146 Still, the Additional Protocol serves as evidence of the growing acknowledgment of 
the presence and environmental needs of indigenous peoples as communities rather than as 
collectives of individuals. 
 
141 Id. at Art. 1(2). 
142 ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL TO THE AMERICAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE AREA OF ECONOMIC,
SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS APROTOCOL OF SAN SALVADOR,@ Preamble.   
143 See id. (addressing Athe close relationship that exists between economic, social and cultural rights, and civil 
and political rights, in that the different categories of rights constitute an indivisible whole based on the recognition of the 
dignity of the human persona.@). 
144 Id. at Preamble. 
145 Id. at Art. 5 (declaring that State laws restricting human rights may do so Aonly to the extent that they are not 
incompatible with the purpose and reason underlying those rights@). 
146 Id. at Art. 11 (entitled ARight to a Healthy Environment,@ the Article begins with a provision asserting the 
individual=s Aright to live in a healthy environment and to have access to basic public services.@ Thus, it makes its 
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All these instruments may be viewed as harbingers of a string of international documents that 
directly addressed the importance of territory and natural resources in indigenous cultures, and the 
idea that an indigenous peoples= self-determination and even its survival as an identifiable people 
may depend on its ability to control its environment.  The following subsections discuss seven of 
these instruments that emerged in the late 1980's and early 1990's. 
1. Our Common Future 
It is a terrible irony that as formal development reaches more deeply 
into rain forests, deserts, and other isolated environments, it tends to 
destroy the only cultures that have proved able to thrive in these 
environments.147 
1987 witnessed the first significant international instrument that acknowledged the centrality 
of environmental rights in addressing the plight of indigenous peoples as well as the importance of 
traditional habits and knowledge in addressing the plight of the natural environment.  Declaring itself 
no less than Aa global agenda for change,@ Our Common Future, also known as the Brundtland 
Commission Report, was authored by the U.N. World Commission on Environment and 
Development.148 As the first widely recognized statement of a Aunifying theme in environmental 
protection in the international community,@ the Brundtland Commission Report stands as the 
flagstaff of the sustainable development movement.149 As such, the Report addresses a wide 
spectrum of environmental issues with pertinence to indigenous peoples, including the positive and 
 
primary thrust public health.).  
147 OUR COMMON FUTURE, supra note 128, at ch. 4, para. 74, p. 115 (Oxford Univ. Press ed., 1987). 
148 Id. (Oxford Univ. Press ed., 1987); see Chairman=s Foreward, p. ix. 
149 See Watters, supra note 10, at 269: 
With remarkable foresight, the Report remains, fifteen years after its publication, an eloquent 
testament for advancing environmental protection, rights, including those of indigenous peoples, and 
sustainable development.  Indeed it is not too much to say that the Commission=s formulation of 
sustainable development remains the most widely recognized, unifying theme in environmental 
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negative environmental impacts of development,150 the links between poverty and environmental 
degradation,151 and the fact that in many instances those who bear the costs of pollution are not 
themselves polluters and receive no benefits of polluting activities.152 
But the Report does far more than treat indigenous populations as just another minority 
population group.  Citing social discrimination, cultural barriers, and the exclusion of indigenous 
peoples from the political arena, the Report worries that the marginalization of such peoples could 
amount to their Acultural extinction.@153 This would not only be unjust and inhumane, the Report 
asserts, but also a loss for the environment. 
These communities are the repositories of vast accumulations of traditional 
knowledge and experience that links humanity with its ancient origins.  Their 
disappearance is a loss for the larger society, which could learn a great deal from 
their traditional skills in sustainably managing very complex ecological systems.154 
In addition, unlike earlier international documents, Our Common Future stresses the needs 
and vulnerability of indigenous peoples in terms other than demands that nations share technology 
 
protection in the international community.  (footnotes omitted) 
150 See, e.g., OUR COMMON FUTURE, supra note 128, at ch. 1, para. 8-9, p. 28-9 (Oxford Univ. Press ed., 1987): 
Environmental stress has often been seen as the result of the growing demand of scarce resources and 
the pollution generated by the rising living standards of the relatively affluent.  But poverty itself 
pollutes the environment, creating environmental stress in a different way. . . .  
On the other hand, where economic growth has led to improvements in living standards, it has 
sometimes been achieved in ways that are globally damaging in the longer term . . . . Thus today=s
environmental challenges arise both from the lack of development and from the unintended 
consequences of some forms of economic growth.  
151 See, e.g., id. at ch. 1, para. 16, p. 30 (Oxford Univ. Press ed., 1987): 
[Natural] disasters claim most of their victims among the impoverished in poor nations, where 
subsistence farmers must make their land more liable to droughts and floods by clearing marginal 
areas, and where the poor make themselves more vulnerable to all disasters by living on steep slops 
and unprotected shores C the only lands left for their shanties. 
152 See, e.g., id. at ch. 1, para. 27, p. 34 (Oxford Univ. Press ed., 1987): AMany who bear these risks [posed by 
radioactive waste, for example] do not benefit in any way from the activities that produce the wastes.@
More generally, Part I of the Report addresses sustainable development and the international economy.  Part II 
addresses population, food supply, species protection, and energy, industrial, and urban challenges.  Part III addresses the 
global commons, the links between environmental stresses and conflict, and the legal challenges.  
153 Id. at ch. 4, para. 73, p. 114 (Oxford Univ. Press ed., 1987). 
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and recognize tribal property rights so as to allow indigenous peoples to advance economically 
through integration into the dominant culture.155 To the contrary, Our Common Future states that 
Aindigenous peoples will need special attention as the forces of economic development disrupt their 
traditional life-styles B life-styles that can offer modern societies many lessons in the management of 
resources in complex forest, mountain and dryland ecosystems,@ and notes that A[s]ome [indigenous 
communities] are threatened with virtual extinction by insensitive development over which they have 
no control.@156 As such, the Report asserts, Atheir traditional rights should be recognized and they 
should be given a decisive voice in formulating policies about resource development in their 
areas.@157 
154 Id. at ch. 4, para. 74, p. 114, 15 (Oxford Univ. Press ed., 1987). 
155 See, e.g., id. at xi, criticizing the fact that A[t]he word >development= has . . . been narrowed by some into a 
very limited focus, along the lines of >what poor nations should do to become richer= . . .@ See also id. at p. 3: AThere has 
been a growing realization in national governments and multilaterial institutions that it is impossible to separate economic 
development issues from environment issues: many forms of development erode the environmental resources upon which 
they must be based, and environmental degradation can undermine economic development.@
156 OUR COMMON FUTURE, supra note 128, at Overview, para. 46, p. 12 (Oxford Univ. Press ed., 1987). 
157 Id.
2. International Labor Organization Convention No. 169 
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Perhaps the strongest contemporary statement of international responsiveness to indigenous 
peoples= demands for recognition as autonomous societies emerged in 1989 in the form of the 
International Labor Organization Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in 
Independent Countries, generally known as ILO Convention No. 169.158 ILO Convention No. 169, 
the result of long-term efforts by human rights groups to promote the protection of indigenous rights, 
 replaced ILO Convention No. 107, which, as noted above, endorsed assimilation as the means to 
achieve equality between indigenous and non-indigenous populations.159 Representing a reversal of 
that philosophy, ILO Convention No. 169 expresses the ideal of indigenous peoples maintaining and 
 strengthening their cultural identities as distinct communities existing within larger communities.160 
Its preamble recognizes the unique cultural contributions indigenous peoples offer 
humankind, both in terms of diversity and in their relationship with nature, which the Convention 
terms their Aecological harmony.@161 At the same time, the preamble acknowledges the unique 
threats that assimilationist policies have presented to the cultural survival of indigenous peoples, 
including their Alaws, values, customs and perspectives.@162 Thus, ILO Convention No. 169 
 
158 INTERNATIONAL LABOR CONFERENCE, DRAFT REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CONVENTION NO. 107, 
Appendix I, C.C. 107/D. 303 (June 1989), 28 I.L.M. 1382 (1989). 
159 ILO Convention No. 169 expressly rejects the integrationist theme of its predecessor Convention.  See ILO 
CONVENTION NO. 169, Preamble, para. 4: 
developments in the situation of indigenous and tribal peoples in all regions of the world, have made it 
appropriate to adopt new international standards . . . with a view to removing the assimilationist 
orientation of the earlier standards 
160 Id. at Preamble, para. 5: 
Recognizing the aspirations of [indigenous and tribal] peoples to exercise control over their own 
institutions, ways of life and economic development and to maintain and develop their identities, 
languages and religions, within the framework of the States in which their live 
161 Id. at Preamble, para. 7: ACalling attention to the distinctive contributions of indigenous and tribal peoples to 
the cultural diversity and social and ecological harmony of humankind and to international co-operation and 
understanding.@
162 Id. at Preamble, para. 6: 
Noting that in many parts of the world these peoples are unable to enjoy their fundamental human 
rights to the same degree as the rest of the population of the States within which they live, and that 
their laws, values, customs and perspectives have often been eroded 
45 
integrates self-determination and environmental values in its statement that the nations of the world 
both need and are threatening to extinguish their indigenous populations. 
In addition to its Preamble language, ILO Convention No. 169 sets forth a number of specific 
directives concerning the environment that may be expressed as five distinct environmental rights. 
First, Article 4 introduces the state obligation to protect indigenous peoples= environments from 
intrusion or exploitation by outsiders, requiring Aspecial measures@ to be adopted Aas appropriate for 
safeguarding the persons, institutions, property, labour, cultures and environment@ of indigenous 
populations.163 Article 18 addresses this concern also, declaring that A[a]dequate penalties . . . be 
established by law for unauthorized intrusion upon, or use of, the lands of the people concerned, and 
[that] governments . . . take measures to prevent such offenses.@164 
A second category of environmental right addressed by ILO Convention No. 169 is that of 
giving indigenous peoples a voice in managing development programs impacting their 
environmental interests.  Article 7, for example, declares that indigenous peoples have Athe right to 
decide their own priorities for the process of development as it affects their lives, beliefs, 
[territories], [lands], institutions and spiritual well-being,@ and demands that A[g]overnments . . . take 
measures, in cooperation with the peoples concerned, to protect and preserve the environment of the 
territories they inhabit.@165 Article 7 identifies impact studies carried out in cooperation with the 
indigenous peoples concerned as one method that the peoples may control the environmental impacts 
of planned development activities.166 Article 15, addressing natural resources, also identifies an 
environmental right in indigenous peoples Ato participate in the use, management and conservation of 
 
163 Id. at Art. 4(1).  In keeping with the ideals of self-determination, Article 4(2) notes that: ASuch special 
measures shall not be contrary to the freely-expressed wishes of the peoples concerned.@
164 Id. at Art. 18. 
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[their] resources.@167 Article 15 goes on to require states to Aestablish or maintain procedures through 
which they shall consult [with the indigenous] peoples . . . before undertaking or permitting any 
programmes for the exploration or exploitation of [mineral or sub-surface] resources pertaining to 
their lands.@168 
A third environmental right that ILO Convention No. 169 recognizes is that of property and 
natural resource ownership.  Article 14 states outright that A[t]he rights of ownership and possession 
of the peoples concerned over the lands which they traditionally occupy shall be recognised,@ and is 
sensitive enough to require that A[p]articular attention . . . be paid to the situation of nomadic peoples 
and shifting cultivators.@169 Article 14 sets governments the task of formally identifying and 
protecting the lands occupied by indigenous peoples, and also of establishing procedures to settle 
land claim disputes.170 Adding to the property focus of Article 14, Article 15 recognizes indigenous 
peoples= ownership interests in natural resources on their traditional territories, requiring states to 
specifically safeguard these interests.171 A fourth, related indigenous environmental right is the right 
to state aid in developing agrarian programs, a right fortified by the government obligation to value 
and promote rural and community-based industries.172 
165 ILO CONVENTION NO. 169, supra note 159, at Art. 7(1) (brackets in original), (4). 
166 Id. at Art. 7(3). 
167 Id. at Art. 15(1). 
168 Id. at Art. 15(2).  It is worth noting that this consultation requirement applies A[i]n cases in which the State 
retains the ownership of mineral or sub-surface resources or rights to other resources pertaining to [indigenous] lands.@
The section finishes by stating that A[t]he peoples concerned shall wherever possible participate in the benefits of such 
activities, and shall receive fair compensation for any damages which they main sustain as a result of such activities.@
169 Id. at Art. 14(1).  Article 14(1) goes on to specify that Ameasures shall be taken in appropriate cases to 
safeguard the right of the peoples concerned to use lands not exclusively occupied by them, but to which they have 
traditionally had access for their subsistence and traditional activities.@
170 Id. at Art. 14(2), (3). 
171 ILO CONVENTION NO. 169, at Art. 15(1). 
172 Id. at Art. 19, requiring A[n]ational agrarian programmes [so as to] secure to the peoples concerned treatment 
equivalent to that accorded to other sectors of the population.@ See also id. at Art. 23(1) (referring to subsistence 
economy and traditional activities such as hunting, fishing, trapping and gathering): AGovernments shall, with the 
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Perhaps the most important environmental right recognized in ILO Convention No. 169 
stems from its acknowledgment of the interconnectedness between the environment and indigenous 
culture, which squarely brings environmental and natural resource issues into the issue of indigenous 
peoples= identity and survival.  Article 13 addresses this straightforwardly, requiring states to Arespect 
the special importance for the cultures and spiritual values of the peoples concerned of their 
relationship with the land or territories . . . which they occupy or otherwise use, and in particular the 
collective aspects of this relationship.@173 Article 23, similarly, declares that Asubsistence economy 
and traditional activities of the [indigenous] peoples . . . such as hunting, fishing, trapping and 
gathering, shall be recognized as important factors in the maintenance of their cultures and in their 
self-reliance and development.@174 
ILO Convention No. 169 consist primarily of broad directives ordering participating 
governments to view indigenous peoples as deserving of special protections and to develop laws and 
programs through which to protect various interests of indigenous peoples residing within their 
national boundaries.  Its lack of specificity might allow speculation as to its effectiveness as a legal 
instrument.  Nevertheless, the Convention stands as one of the leading expressions of international 
recognition of the importance of indigenous cultures and the significance of their environment to 
their cultural survival. 
 
participation of these peoples and whenever appropriate, ensure that these activities are strengthened and promoted.@ See 
also id. at Art. 23(2):  AUpon the request of the peoples concerned, appropriate technical and financial assistance shall be 
provided wherever possible, taking into account the traditional technologies and cultural characteristics of these peoples, 
as well as the importance of sustainable and equitable development.@
173 Id. at Art. 13(1). 
174 Id. at Art. 23(1). 
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3. The World Bank Operational Directive on Indigenous Peoples 
The World Bank is an agency of the United Nation that promotes economic and social 
development on a global scale.  In 1991, the World Bank promulgated Operational Directive 4.20: 
Indigenous Peoples.175 The 1991 Operational Directive sets forth the World Bank=s policies and 
procedures for Bank-assisted projects that may detrimentally impact indigenous peoples, including 
agricultural projects, road construction, forestry projects, hydropower projects and mining projects, 
among others.176 Its primary goal is to sensitize those engaging in such activities as to the needs and 
vulnerabilities of indigenous peoples, particularly with regard to Atheir interests and right in land and 
other productive resources.@177 In setting its overarching theme as a focused sensitivity to the 
connection between indigenous peoples and their environmental resources, the Directive=s provisions 
reveal a heightened awareness about a number of concerns left unaddressed in earlier international 
instruments.  For example, the Directive identifies its foremost objective as: 
to ensure that the development process fosters full respect for [indigenous peoples=]
dignity, human rights, and cultural uniqueness.  More specifically, the objective at the 
center of this directive is to ensure that indigenous peoples do not suffer adverse 
effects during the development process, particularly from Bank-financed projects, 
and theat they receive culturally compatible social and economic benefits.178 
Unlike the language of many prior instruments that address the need to provide development 
opportunities for developing nations, this language evidences a recognition that development can 
threaten an indigenous peoples= cultural identity.179 Moreover, because the Directive focuses 
 
175 WORLD BANK OPERATIONAL DIRECTIVE 4.20: INDIGENOUS PEOPLES (September 17, 1991). 
176 Id. at para. 10: AIssues concerning indigenous peoples can arise in a variety of sectors that concern the Bank: 
those involving, for example, agriculture, road construction, forestry, hydropower, mining, tourism, education, and the 
environment should be carefully screened.@
177 Id. at para. 2.  The Directive offers Apolicy guidance@ intended to ensure that Bank projects benefit 
indigenous peoples and also to minimize adverse impacts on indigenous peoples.  Id. 
178 Id. at para. 6. 
179 Similarly, paragraph 15 of the Directive warns that A[i]n many cases, proper protection of the rights of 
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primarily on land and resource related projects, the quoted language also reveals the Bank=s
recognition of the close tie between an indigenous peoples= culture and its environment. 
Other provisions in the Directive link the concepts of self-determination and environmental 
decisionmaking more directly than may be discerned in prior instruments.  Among its statements of 
objectives and policies, the Directive states that strategies for addressing issues relating to indigenous 
peoples Amust be based on the informed participation of the indigenous peoples themselves.@180 Its 
primary prerequisite for successful development plan states that A[t]he key step in project design is 
the preparation of a culturally appropriate development plan based on full consideration of the 
options preferred by the indigenous peoples affected by the project.@181 Elsewhere, the Directive 
advises that development plans include strategies Afor participation by indigenous people in decision 
making through project planning, implementation, and evaluation.@182 
Perhaps the Directive=s strongest assertion of the need for indigenous peoples to maintain 
control over their own destiny is its provision advising that all development plans include an 
assessment of the legal status of the indigenous peoples that might be impacted by a World Bank 
project, along with an assessment of whether the legal system will actually protect them.183 That 
provision ends with the warning that: A[p]articular attention should be given to the rights of 
indigenous peoples to use and develop the lands that they occupy, to be protected against illegal 
 
indigenous people will require the implementation of special project components that may be outside the primary 
project=s objectives.  These components can include activities related to . . . linguistic and cultural preservation [and] 
entitlement to natural resources.@ Id. at para. 15. 
180 Id. at para. 8 (emphasis in original). 
181 WORLD BANK OPERATIONAL DIRECTIVE 4.20, supra note 175, at para. 14(a).  The development plan 
prerequisites also include the directive that A[p]lanning should encourage early handover of project management to local 
people.@
182 Id. at para. 15(d). 
183 Id. at para. 15(a): AThe [development] plan should contain an assessment of (I) the legal status of the groups 
covered by this [Operational Directive], as reflected in the country=s constitution, legislation, and subsidiary legislation 
(regulations, administrative orders, etc.); and (ii) the ability of such groups to obtain access to and effectively use the 
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intruders, and to have access to natural resources (such as forests, wildlife, and water) vital to their 
subsistence and reproduction.@184 Complementing the requirement that development plans assess the 
legal status of indigenous peoples, the directive also advises that where the Bank perceives that 
indigenous peoples= rights are weak, it should work to strengthen them through legislative or other 
means.185 In these provisions, the Directive ties indigenous peoples= self-determination to 
environmental dominion and preservation, and acknowledges that development can threaten those 
indigenous interests to the point where significant actions may be necessary to offset that threat.186 
4. The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development 
The Earth Summit of 1992 stands as a significant moment in the recognition of indigenous 
peoples= rights, if only due to the breadth of participation in the Summit and the global interest in its 
 
legal system to defend their rights.@
184 Id. 
185 Id. at para. 15(c): 
When local legislation needs strengthening, the Bank should offer to advise and assist the Borrower in 
establishing legal recognition of the customary or traditional land tenure systems of indigenous 
peoples.  Where the traditional lands of indigenous peoples have been brought by law into the domain 
of the state and where it is inappropriate to convert traditional rights into those of legal ownership, 
alternative arrangements should be implemented to grant long-term, renewable rights of custodianship 
and use to indigenous peoples.  These steps should be taken before the initiation of other planning 
steps that may be contingent on recognized land titles.  
186 A 2003 World Bank Report reviewed projects developed under the guidelines of the  Operational Directive, 
and recommended that the Bank: 
(i)   clarify the intent, scope, and requirements of the [Operational Directive]; 
(ii) distinguish clearly between the safeguard (do no harm) aspects of the [Operational Directive] and 
its do good aspects. . . .  
(iii) identify indigenous and tribal groups in a manner consistent with the country=s legal framework.  
In countries where the legal framework does not meet the standards of the policy relating to coverage 
of [indigenous peoples], the Bank should ensure that [indigenous peoples] are protected within the 
overall framework of its poverty reduction policies and establish a project-level policy to monitor 
disaggregated impact on [indigenous peoples]. 
(iv) ensure that in countries with significant [indigenous peoples] populations the Country director . . . 
engage the Borrower in discussions on how the Bank can best assist the country in providing culturally 
appropriate assistance to the [indigenous peoples] within the context of the Country Assistance 
Strategy . . .  
(v) design regional and sub-regional strategies to implement the [Operational Directive] given the 
significant differences in circumstances faced by Bank staff in implement the policy.  
Operations Evaluation Department Country Evaluation and Regional Relations, IMPLEMENTATION OF OPERATIONAL 
51 
work product.187 That work product, the Rio Declaration, is a short series of statements cast as 
principles, most of which address the responsibilities of nation states to their populations and to one 
another.188 
Principle 22 is the sole provision of the Declaration that addresses indigenous peoples.  It 
states: 
Indigenous people and their communities . . . have a vital role in environmental 
management and development because of their knowledge and traditional practices.  
States should recognize and duly support their identity, culture and interests and 
enable their effective participation in the achievement of sustainable development.189 
Like ILO Convention No. 169, the Declaration casts indigenous cultures as key to the success of 
dominant cultures insofar as their efforts to manage the health of the natural environment.  Although 
it does not add to the sentiments expressed in Convention 169, it stands as a eloquent, highly public 
statement of the symbiosis between environmental protection and indigenous peoples= territorial 
rights and customs. 
5. The Convention on Biological Diversity 
In addition to the Rio Declaration, several other important documents addressing global 
environmental issues emerged from the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro.190 Among these is the 
 
DIRECTIVE 4.20 ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES: AN INDEPENDENT DESK REVIEW, Report No. 25332 (January 10, 2003), at 2-3. 
187 RIO DECLARATION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, 33 I.L.M. 874, 880 (1992).  On the significance 
of the Earth Summit, see Watters, supra note 10, at 271: A[The Earth Summit] was a milestone because it involved 
participation on a scale far beyond any previous international forum addressing law and the environment.@
188 RIO DECLARATION, supra note 187.  Approximately seven of the Declaration=s twenty-seven principles 
address states= obligations to protect the environment within their borders.  See id. at Principles 3, 4, 8, 9, 11, 15, and 17. 
 Approximately twelve principles address states= obligations to other states vis a vis the environment.  See id. at Principles 
1, 10, 13, 16, 20, 21, and 23.  Other principles address the environmental rights of individuals or non-governmental 
groups, and some offer observations that are not stated in terms of obligations or rights.  See, e.g, id. at Principle 25, 
observing that A[p]eace, development and environmental protection are interdependent and indivisible.@
189 Id. at Principle 22. 
190 See the FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 31 I.L.M. 849 (1992); see also the STATEMENT OF 
PRINCIPLES FOR A GLOBAL CONSENSUS OF THE MANAGEMENT, CONSERVATION AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT OF ALL 
TYPES OF FORESTS, 31 I.L.M. 881 (1992). 
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Convention on Biological Diversity, which expands upon the Rio Declaration=s assertion that 
indigenous peoples serve an important function in the conservation of biological diversity.191 
For example, Article 8 of the Convention, which addresses in-situ conservation, orders 
signing parties to Arespect, preserve, and maintain knowledge, innovations and practices of 
indigenous and local communities embodying traditional lifestyles relevant for the conservation and 
sustainable use of biological diversity and promote their wider application with the approval and 
involvement of the holders of such knowledge, innovations and practices.@192 Article 10, on the 
sustainable use of components of biological diversity, urges parties to the Convention to A[p]rotect 
and encourage customary use of biological resources in accordance with traditional cultural practices 
that are compatible with conservation or sustainable use requirements,@193 thus also recognizing the 
environmental benefits of indigenous practices.  Finally, Article 18, which addresses the issue of 
technical and scientific cooperation, exhorts participating parties to Aencourage and develop methods 
of cooperation for the development and use of technologies, including indigenous and traditional 
technologies, in pursuance of the objectives of this Convention.@194 All these statements reveal not 
only an appreciation for indigenous customs insofar as their tendency to promote biological diversity, 
but also reveal a sensitivity to the place that indigenous peoples should occupy in environmental 
planning and policy development. 
6. The Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
 In 1993, the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations completed its Draft  
 
191 CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, 31 I.L.M. 818 (1992) (entered into force December, 1993). 
192 Id. at Art. 8(j). 
193 Id. at Art. 10(c). 
194 Id. at Art. 18(4). 
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Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.195 The Draft Declaration covers a wide 
spectrum of issues of importance to indigenous peoples, with its prologue touching on 
fundamental human rights, self-determination, development, demilitarization of indigenous 
territories, and economic and social progress.196 The spectrum of rights detailed in the Draft 
Declaration=s forty-five Articles include rights against genocide; the right to maintain a distinct 
identity; rights to protection and security in periods of armed conflict; rights associated with 
spiritual traditions, languages and oral traditions; rights to all levels and forms of state education; 
the right of self-representation and the right to participate in the legislative and administrative 
processes; rights associated with the development of economic and social programs; rights to 
health services, including the right to use traditional medicines and health practices; cultural and 
intellectual property rights; and self-government in matters related to internal affairs.197 
Significant among the rights addressed in the Draft Declaration are those associated with 
land, territories, and natural resources.  The prologue places special emphasis on the environmental 
wrongs suffered by indigenous peoples, recognizing the Aurgent need to respect and promote the 
inherent rights and characteristics of indigenous peoples, especially their rights to their land, 
territories and resources, which derive from their political, economic and social structures and from 
 
195 DRAFT DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON 
INDIGENOUS POPULATIONS ON ITS ELEVENTH SESSION, U.N. Comm. On Human Rights, Sub-Comm. On Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, U.N. DOC. E/CN.4/1995/2: E/CN.4/Sub. 2/1994/56 (October 28, 1994), 34 
I.L.M. 541 (1995).  The Working Group began its effort to draft a human rights instrument directed at the protection of 
indigenous peoples in 1987.  It produced a refined draft in 1993.  34 I.L.M. at 542. 
196 Id. at 34 I.L.M. 546-7.  The prologue affirms that indigenous peoples are Aequal in dignity and rights to all 
other peoples,@ that Aall peoples contribute to the diversity and richness of civilization,@ and that Aall doctrines, policies 
and practices based on . . . racial, religious, ethnic or cultural differences are . . . morally condemnable and socially 
unjust.@ It expresses concern over indigenous peoples having been Adeprived of their human rights and fundamental 
freedoms@ resulting in their Acolonization and dispossession of their lands, territories and resources.@
197 See, e.g., id., at Arts. 7, 8, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 19, 20, 22, 24, 25, 29, and 31. 
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their cultures, spiritual traditions, histories and philosophies.@198 Thus in its opening language, the 
Draft Declaration squarely asserts the interconnectedness of indigenous cultural survival and 
environmental rights. 
Following this introduction, the Draft Declaration addresses a number of environmental 
issues of significance to indigenous peoples, including protection from outsiders, recognition of 
property rights, restitution for past injustices, and the right to revitalize indigenous culture through 
connections with the environment.  Environmental protection is addressed in Article 7, which 
charges states with the responsibility to prevent or redress actions that aim to dispossess indigenous 
peoples of their lands or natural resources.199 Similarly, Article 10 bans the forcible removal of 
indigenous peoples from their lands, and limits any relocation to that which takes place with Athe free 
and informed consent of the indigenous peoples concerned and after agreement on just and fair 
compensation and, where possible, with the option of return.@200 Article 28 demands protection 
against a different sort of invasion, charging states with the obligation to Atake effective measures to 
ensure that no storage or disposal of hazardous materials shall take place in the lands and territories 
of indigenous peoples.@201 Related to these demands for legal protection of the indigenous 
environment is Article 30's demand that indigenous peoples maintain the authority to Adetermine and 
develop strategies for the development and use of their lands,@ which includes a consent right for any 
project impacting their environmental resources.@202 
198 Id. The prologue goes on to link control over development affecting indigenous peoples= lands and natural 
resources with the strengthening of their institutions, cultures, and traditions.  It also links indigenous knowledge, culture, 
and traditions with proper management of the environment.  Id. 
199 Id. at Art. 7(b). 
200 Id. at Art. 10. 
201 DRAFT  DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, supra note 195, at Art. 28. 
202 Id. at Art. 30, specifying a particular interest in tribal consent authority over Athe development, utilization or 
exploitation of mineral, water or other resources.@ It is worth noting that Article 30 does not assert an ownership interest 
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Other articles of the Draft Declaration address the needs of indigenous peoples to revitalize 
their culture by reconnecting with their environment.  Articles 27 and 28 address the indigenous right 
to reoccupy land and restore its environmental condition.  Article 27 declares that A[i]ndigenous 
peoples have the right to restitution of the lands, territories and resources which they have 
traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or used, which have been confiscated, occupied, used or 
damaged without their free and informed consent.@203 Article 28, in turn, addresses environmental 
restoration, declaring that A[i]ndigenous peoples have the right to the conservation, restoration and 
protection of the total environment and the productive capacity of their lands, territories and 
resources, as well as to assistance for this purpose from States and through international 
cooperation.@204 
Articles 25 and 26 may be the Draft Declaration=s most significant statements of an 
indigenous environmental right, as these articles directly address the symbiosis between indigenous 
peoples and their natural environment, including the connection between indigenous peoples and 
their traditional territory for sustenance and cultural practices.  Article 25 states that A[i]ndigenous 
peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their distinctive spiritual and material relationship 
with the lands, territories, waters and coastal seas and other resources which they have traditionally 
owned or otherwise occupied or used, and to uphold their responsibilities to future generations in this 
regard.@205 Article 26, in turn, declares: 
Indigenous peoples have the right to own, develop, control and use the lands and 
 
in indigenous peoples over their land, while Article 29 states that A[i]ndigenous peoples are entitled to the recognition of 
the full ownership, control and protection of their cultural and intellectual property.@
203 Id. at Art. 27, which goes on to assert the right to just compensation where restitution is not possible, and to 
specify that compensation shall take the form of Alands, territories, and resources equal in quality, size and legal status@ to 
that lost.  Id. 
204 Id. at Art. 28, which goes on to ban uninvited military activities on indigenous lands. 
205 Id. at Art. 25. 
56 
territories, including the total environment of the lands, air, waters, coastal seas, sea-
ice, flora and fauna and other resources which they have traditionally owned or 
otherwise occupied or used.  This includes the right to the full recognition of their 
laws, traditions and customs, land-tenure systems and institutions for the 
development and management of resources, and the right to effective measures by 
states to prevent any interference with, alienation of or encroachment upon these 
rights.206 
Overall, these Articles assert the rights of indigenous peoples in terms that evidence the 
international community=s awareness of the link between ecology and indigenous spiritualism as well 
as sustenance.  The Draft Declaration=s provisions also stress the importance of the state=s
recognition of indigenous peoples= property rights and its legal protection of those rights. 
7. The Johannesburg Declaration and Plan of Implementation of the World Summit 
on Sustainable Development 
 
In 2002, the World Summit on Sustainable Development that took place in Johannesburg, 
South Africa produced a Declaration affirming the commitments to sustainable development set 
forth in the Rio Declaration.207 As a short, sometimes flowery reminder of the earth=s peoples=
obligation to sustain the planet=s natural resources for future generations, the Johannesburg 
Declaration focuses on two main objectives in that mission.  First, the Declaration identifies the goal 
of achieving essential human dignity for all persons, defined as access to basic conditions defining a 
healthy, comfortable lifestyle, access to development opportunities, and the recognition and equal 
treatment of all members of the global community.208 Second, the Declaration stresses its 
 
206 Id. at Art. 26. 
207 THE JOHANNESBURG DECLARATION ON SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, Provisions 1, 8 (Sept. 4, 2002). 
208 Id. at Provision 2 (addressing the signatories commitment Ato build a humane, equitable and caring global 
society cognizant of the need for human dignity for all@); Provision 12 (warning that A[t]he deep fault line that divides 
human society between the rich and the poor and the ever-increasing gap between the developed and developing worlds  
pose a major threat to global prosperity, security and stability@); Provision 18 (addressing human dignity as requiring 
Aaccess to basic requirements such as clean water, sanitation, adequate shelter, energy, health care, food, security and the 
protection of bio-diversity,@ and identifying as related to these Aaccess to financial resources, . . . modern technology to 
bring about development, and . . . technology transfer, human resource development, education and training to banish 
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commitment to a multifaceted approach to environmental stewardship, including poverty eradication, 
informed consumptive and production patterns, and environmentally sensitive economic and social 
development, all elements of sustainable development.209 The Declaration makes reference to the 
Arich diversity@ of humankind, which it defines as a strength in attaining the ideal of a global program 
of sustainable development.210 In a separate provision, the Declaration asserts without elaboration 
Athe vital role of the indigenous peoples in sustainable development.@211 
Fleshing out the Johannesburg Declaration is the Plan of Implementation of the World 
Summit on Sustainable Development.212 In an introductory provisions, this eleven chapter document 
cites Arespect for cultural diversity@ as one of the essential means toward a global system of 
sustainable development.213 In keeping with this call for heightened awareness of the differing needs 
of diverse segments of the earth=s population, a number of the Plan=s provisions call for particular 
 
forever underdevelopment@); Provision 19 (identifying Asevere threats to the sustainable development@ as Achronic 
hunger; malnutrition; foreign occupation; armed conflicts; illicit drug problems; organized crime; corruption; natural 
disasters; illicit arms trafficking; trafficking in persons; terrorism; intolerance and incitement to racial, ethnic, religious 
and other hatreds; xenophobia; and endemic, communicable and chronic diseases, in particular HIV/AIDS, malaria and 
tuberculosis@); Provision 20 (addressing women=s empowerment)     
209 Id. at Provision 5 (addressing the Acollective responsibility to advance and strengthen the interdependent and 
mutually reinforcing pillars of sustainable development B economic development, social development and environmental 
protection B at local, national, regional and global levels@); Provision 8 (identifying Athe protection of the environment, 
and social and economic development [as] fundamental to sustainable development@); Provision 11 (identifying Apoverty 
eradication, changing consumption and production patterns, and protecting and managing the natural resource base for 
economic and social development [as] overarching objectives of, and essential requirements for sustainable 
development@); Provision 21 (coupling Apoverty eradication and sustainable development@).  
210 Id. at Provision 16 (identifying Aour rich diversity, which is our collective strength,@ as the basis of 
Aconstructive partnership for change and for the achievement of the common goal of sustainable development@).  
Provision 10 references the Summit=s Arich tapestry of peoples and views [as aiding in the] constructive search for a 
common path, towards a world that respects and implements the vision of sustainable development.@ Provision 26 
recognizes that Asustainable development requires a long-term perspective and broad-based participation in policy 
formulation, decision-making and implementation at all levels.@
211 Id. at Provision 25. 
212 PLAN OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WORLD SUMMIT ON SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, A/Conf.199/20 (2002). 
213 Id. at Provision 5, also citing A[p]eace, security, stability and respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedom, including the right to development@ as Aessential for achieving sustainable development and ensuring that 
sustainable development benefits all.@ Provision 43(b) calls for programs to enable indigenous communities to develop 
and benefit from eco-tourism.   
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attention to be paid to the living conditions of discreet groups, including indigenous peoples.214 
Indeed, indigenous peoples are expressly addressed in seventeen provisions or sub-provisions, some 
of which read like prior declarations urging the availability of opportunities for economic 
development,215 but others of which acknowledge the unique symbiosis between tribal culture and 
environment, and thus the importance of enabling indigenous peoples to profitably share their 
traditional knowledge.216 
In Chapter II on poverty eradication, for example, one provision calls for the recognition of 
the fact that Atraditional and direct dependence on renewable resources and ecosystems, including 
sustainable harvesting, continues to be essential to the cultural, economic and physical well-being of 
indigenous people and their communities.@217 In Chapter IV, which addresses the protection and 
management of the natural resource base of economic and social development, one provision 
recognizes the usefulness of Atraditional and indigenous knowledge@ in mitigating the impacts of 
natural disasters,218 while others call for the enactment of measures to protect and promotion of 
indigenous resource management systems and indigenous models of agricultural production.219 
214 See, e.g., id. at Provision 53, addressing Athe urgent need to address the causes of ill health, including 
environmental causes, and their impact on development, with particular emphasis on . . . vulnerable groups of society, 
such as . . . indigenous peoples.@
215 Id. Provision 7(e) urges the development of means through which Ato improve access by indigenous people 
and their communities to economic activities and increase their employment through . . . measure such as training, 
technical assistance and credit facilities.@ Provision 46(b) calls for the Aparticipation of stakeholders, including . . . 
indigenous communities . . . in minerals, metals and mining development . . .@
216 Id. at Provisions 44(k) (calling for the recognition of the Aspecific role of . . . indigenous . . . communities in 
conserving and using biodiversity in a sustainable way@); Provision 44(j) (promoting the Aeffective participation of 
indigenous . . . communities in decision and policy-making concerning the use of their traditional knowledge@).   
Addressing health and medical needs, Chapter VI calls for the recognition of indigenous communities as Acustodians of 
traditional knowledge and practices.@ Provision 54(h).  See also Provision 64(d) (calling for the promotion of 
Aindigenous medical knowledge, . . . including traditional medicine@). 
217 Id. at Provision 7(e).  Provision 7(h) also recognizes the distinct needs of indigenous communities in 
connection with access to agricultural resources.   
218 PLAN OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WORLD SUMMIT ON SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, supra note 212, at 
Provision 37(f). 
219 Id. at Provision 40(h), (r).  Provision 44(h), which calls for financial and technical support for the 
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Indeed, one provision calls for the development and implementation of Abenefit-sharing mechanisms 
on mutually agreed terms for the use of [traditional] knowledge, innovations and practices.@220 
Although it may be perceived as an omission that indigenous communities are not expressly 
referenced in the Plan=s final section addressing the need for individual nations to institute strategies 
for sustainable development,221 it is apparent from the Plan that environmentalists worldwide have 
come to accept the fact that indigenous peoples= traditional knowledge may serve as a source, rather 
than merely a recipient, of the practices and benefits of environmentally sensitive development 
policies. 
C. Summation 
The international instruments outlined above reveal several trends in the global community=s
sensitivity toward and manner of addressing the environment-related rights of indigenous peoples. 
Positive trends include the shift from a world view favoring assimilation to one favoring self-
determination, the increased awareness of the symbiotic relationship between indigenous cultures 
and the natural environment, and the realization that indigenous knowledge may hold answers to the 
worldwide quest for systems of environmental sustainability.222 These trends denote an evolution in 
 
enhancement of indigenous biodiversity conservation efforts, serves as further evidence of an appreciation of the 
environmental practices of indigenous peoples.  Provision 45(h) calls for the support of indigenous forest management 
systems Ato ensure their full and effective participation in sustainable forest management.@
220 Id. at Provision 44(j), which also calls for the recognition of the Arights of local and indigenous communities 
who are holders of traditional knowledge, innovations and practices,@ but acknowledges that any mutually beneficial 
agreement for the sharing of traditional knowledge must be A[s]ubject to national legislation.@
221 Id. at Provisions 162-170 (addressing the need for nations to formulate national strategies for sustainable 
development, and the need for partnerships among governmental and non-governmental groups in programs and activities 
that aim to achieve sustainable development). 
222 One expert summarized the trend as follows: 
1.  The right to self-determination with sovereignty over natural resources; 
2.  The right to health including the right to freedom from health-threatening environmental 
degradation; 
3.  The right to information about the environment; 
4.  The right to participate in environmental decision-making; 
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the international community=s appreciation for the significance and cultural value of preserving 
indigenous peoples, an evolution that coincides with the international community=s growing 
appreciation of the need for environmental protection in general, which includes the need to renew 
traditional forms of natural resource husbandry.  The result of this enlightenment is that our most 
recent international instruments addressing indigenous peoples and their environment focus on more 
than protecting these cultures; the new focus is on how the non-indigenous population may learn 
about environmental protection and the value of natural resources from the older, indigenous 
cultures. 
III. From Rhetoric to Application: Two International Court Cases on 
Indigenous Peoples= Environmental Rights 
 
5.  The right to free association; 
6.  The right to preservation and the use of the environment for cultural purposes; 
7.  The right to freedom from discrimination and the right of equal protection of the law. 
Watters, supra note 10, at 275 (footnote omitted).  
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As evidenced by the discussion of international instruments above, the past several decades 
have witnessed an escalating sense of urgency in the international community that non-indigenous 
governments learn to value and effectively protect their indigenous populations.223 How such 
sentiments translate into domestic law and policy is, however, in most cases necessarily left up to 
individual nations, which have by and large found the task more difficult than the rhetoric of 
international declarations, conventions, and other instruments may suggest.224 Incorporating the 
aspirational declarations of international committees into complex state systems of government and 
law may be difficult enough; applying them to individual disputes has proven even trickier.225 As 
one commentator noted about the various ambitious conventions emerging from the 1992 Earth 
Summit, A[t]hese agreements . . . lacked teeth.  They were largely devoid of the firm commitments 
that had in the past occasionally led to progress on significant international environmental issues.@226 
For this reason, international courts serve a necessary role in implementing the pledges set 
forth in such instruments.  The following sections presents two diverse instances in which an 
 
223 This trend was heralded by the President of the United Nations=General Assembly in 1994 when he declared 
the decade to be devoted to the protection and appreciation of indigenous populations, which, he observed Aconstitute a 
vulnerable group which has long been neglected.@ See Howitt, Connell and Hirsch, supra, note 34, at 10, citing 
Statement by President of the General Assembly at the Commencement of the International Decade of the World=s
Indigenous People, UN INFORMATION CO-ORDINATOR GA/8842 (Dec. 9, 1994). 
224 See Howitt, Connell, and Hirsch, supra note 34, at 1: 
Fundamental changes in the global political order during the 1990s have thrown open complex issues 
of sovereignty, territoriality and nationhood.  Questions of what constitutes nation states, relations 
between nation states and their constituent peoples and territories, and the nature of national 
sovereignty are not longer quite so clear-cut as they once seemed. 
225 See David M. Driesen, Essay: Thirty Years of International Environmental Law: A Retrospective and Plea 
for Reinvigoration, 30 SYRACUSE J. INT=L. & COM. 353, 364 (2003): AAnyone who has worked on implementing 
environmental law (as I have) appreciates its multilayered nature.  In practice, a huge number of things have to go right in 
order for law to have favorable physical effects upon the environment.  At the international level, this problem becomes 
compounded.@
226 See id. at 364: (discussing the CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818 (1942); 
the UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, May 9, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 849 (1992); Agenda 21, 
the U.N. CONFERENCE ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, AGENDA 21, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151.26 (1992); and the 
Declaration of Principles, RIO DECLARATION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, U.N. Conference on Environment 
and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/5/Rev. 1, 31 I.L.M.874 (1992). 
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indigenous individual or community called upon a court to recognize and protect the environmental 
rights of indigenous peoples, selected to highlight a number of the concepts and struggles that have 
become part of the landscape of international law on indigenous peoples.  Part A presents the 1985 
United Nations Human Rights Committee case of Kitok v. Sweden, in which the reindeer herding 
interests of a Sami individual were pitted against those of the indigenous group to which he had been 
born.227 Part B details the 2002 Inter-American Court of Human Rights decision on the land and 
natural resource rights of indigenous peoples occupying the rainforest region of Nicaragua.228 
A. The Human Rights Committee on Sovereign Authority in Sami Territory 
The Nordic Sami people occupy four countries in the Arctic and sub-Arctic regions, 
with the bulk of the population dwelling in Norway.229 As occupants of the Scandinavian 
peninsula since the late Middle Ages who currently live within the political borders of 
contemporary countries while maintaining a distinct language, culture, and ethnicity, the 
Sami constitute an indigenous people.230 Like many indigenous peoples, the Sami subsist in 
close symbiosis with the natural environment, as hunters and gatherers, fishermen, trappers, 
and reindeer herders.231 As such, the environment sits at the core of Sami religion, ritual 
 
227 See infra notes 229-277 and accompanying text. 
228 See infra notes 278-322 and accompanying text. 
229 See Watters, supra note 10, at 250, citing Tom Svensson, INSTITUTE FOR COMPARATIVE RESEARCH IN 
HUMAN CULTURE, THE SAMI AND THEIR LAND 13 (1997). 
230 See id. at 250.  See also Bjorn Aarseth, THE SAMI PAST AND PRESENT 2 (1993): AArchaeological sources 
indicate a probable Sami inhabitance [on the Scandinavian peninsula] as early as 100-200 A.D.@
231 See Watters, supra note 10, at 251: 
[Over time, the Sami] split into subcultures that varied according to livelihood and ecological 
adaptation.  From the sixteenth century on, it is possible to identify major groups.  They are the coastal 
and river Sami, where fishing is vital; the mountain Sami, semi-nomadic reindeer herders, also migrate 
long distances between the tundra and the taiga; the forest Sami; and, the eastern Sami.  The last two 
groups migrating [sic] in the same ecological zone in a semi-nomadic pattern throughout the year.  
(footnotes omitted) 
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practices, and oral heritage.232 
1. Background: Efforts to Recognize Sami Occupation Rights 
For centuries, the Swedish government recognized the Sami as a unique arrangement of 
indigenous communities, possessing governments and territorial borders, and the right to neutrality 
in war.233 Until 1751, there was no national border between Sweden and Norway in Sami 
territory,234 and when the kingdoms of Denmark-Norway and Sweden-Finland entered a territorial 
agreement that fixed their frontiers it included an addendum known as the ASami Codicil,@ which 
attested to the two nations= recognition of the Sami as an ethnic minority that was free to ignore the 
treaty and continue its traditional nomadic practices.235 This was one expression of the Swedish 
acknowledgment of Aallodial land rights,@ or rights in land that existed before the creation of the 
Swedish state.236 
Increasing conflicts between the Sami and non-indigenous interests that sought to exploit the 
natural resources of the Sami territory led to a 1866 joint Norwegian-Swedish commission that 
 
232 See Odd Mathis Haetta, THE ANCIENT RELIGIONS AND FOLK-BELIEFS OF THE SAMI 7 (1994): A[M]ountains 
and hills, boulders and lakes had a life and were able to help people who prayed to them and made sacrifices to them.  
The elemental forces were personified through the Wind Man, the Old Man of Thunder, the Alder Man and other nature 
gods.@ See also, id. at 13: ANatural phenomena such as thunder, wind, and the sun and the moon featured prominently in 
worship in the pre-Christian beliefs of the Sami.  But is was generally not the natural phenomena themselves that were the 
object of virtue, but rather the power that manifested itself through them.@
233 See Kitok v. Sweden, Communication No. 197/1985, U.N. GAOR, Human Rights Committee, 43rd Sess., 
Supp. No. 40, at 207, U.N. Doc. A/43/40, Annex 7(G) (1988), CCPR/C/33/C/197/1985, at para. 5.2; see also id., quoting 
petition of Ivan Kitok: AThis was the Swedish position during the Vasa reign and is well expressed in the royal letters by 
Gustavus Vasa of 1536, 1543, and 1551.  It was also confirmed by Gustavus Adolphus in 1615 and by a royal judgement 
that year for Suondavare Lapp village . . .@
234 Id. 
235 See Watters, supra note 10, at 255-256.  See also Helge Salvesen, Sami Aedan: Four States BOne Nation?,
in ETHNICITY AND NATION BUILDING IN THE NORDIC WORLD 110: A[T]he codicil guaranteed a legal right to land and 
water on the basis of customary practice,@ and at 122: >[The Codicil] contains rules concerning neutrality in the case of 
war; internal Sami administration, including a limited administration of justice, together with the legal confirmation of 
ancient Sami customs.@
236 Kitok v. Sweden, supra note 233, at para. 5.2.  AThese allodial land rights are acknowledged in the travaux 
preparatoires of the 1734 law-book for Sweden, including even Finnish territory.@
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proposed to overhaul the Codicil.237 Although some prominent legal experts in both Norway and 
Sweden called for the acknowledgment of the fact that the Sami property rights recognized in the 
Codicil are rooted in ancient usage and merely codified in the Codicil, the governments of Norway 
and Sweden urged the joint commission to instead interpret Sami interests in the land they occupied 
in a way that would favor the interests of agriculturalists and, ultimately, promote assimilation.238 
The governments= views prevailed as a exercise of national sovereignty, severely curtailing the 
concept of common ownership, and essentially deeming the Sami territory unoccupied and thus 
available for non-Sami occupation.239 In part as a result of this diminished protection, over the past 
century the Sami people have been subjected to diverse pressures on their culture, including 
encroachments into the Sami territories by agriculturalists, miners, timber harvesters, and those 
seeking sources of hydro-power.240 
Laws developed by the non-indigenous society have added to the complexity of the Samis=
cultural and environmental rights.  The Swedish Constitution, for example, states that A[t]he 
possibilities for ethnic, linguistic or religious minorities to preserve and develop a cultural and social 
life fo their own should be promoted.@241 Seemingly in keeping with this prescription, in 1928 the 
 
237 See Watters, supra note 10, at 256. 
238 Id. at 256-59.  Norwegian constitutional law scholar Torkel Aschehoug asserted that the Sami=s legal status 
existed prior to the adoption of the Codicil, so that its cancellation would bring the ancient rights to occupy the Sami 
territory back to life.  Similarly, Swedish parliamentarian Johan Nordstrom concluded that the Sami held an historically-
based form of restrictive covenant over their territory.  In reaching this conclusion, Nordstrom relied on principles of 
international law rooted in natural law.  He insisted that the Sami rights were held collectively, as was consistent with the 
tribe=s historical usage.     
239 Id. at 258. 
240 Id. at 253-54: 
In the twentieth century, dramatic change came with the occupation of Norway by Nazi  Germany in 
April 1940. . . . 
. . . . Development brought new roads, rail lines, airports, towns and large-scale tourism.  
Over time, external forces created pressures on an ecosystem that had always supported a pastoral 
culture and the sustainable use of resources. 
241 Kitok v. Sweden, supra note 233, at para. 4.2, citing to the Constitution of Sweden, Chap. 1, Art. 2, para. 4.  
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Swedish government promulgated a statute addressing reindeer husbandry, updated in 1971 as the 
1971 Reindeer Husbandry Act.242 The Act=s intent was to improve the living conditions of the Sami 
by shielding and thus safeguarding for the future the existence and profitability of reindeer 
husbandry.243 As the Swedish government would later note: Athe area available for reindeer grazing 
limits the total number of reindeer to about 300,000.  Not more than 2,500 Sami [out of a population 
of 15,000 to 20,000] can support themselves on the basis of these reindeer and additional 
incomes.@244 The Reindeer Husbandry Act=s impact, thus, was to divide the Sami population into 
reindeer-herding and non-reindeer-herding Sami.245 
The second half of the twentieth century saw additional forms of change impacting the Sami. 
 The international community began to assert the ideal of self-determination and cultural protection 
in connection with aboriginal populations.  This shift away from a global culture of assimilation 
coincided with the world=s awakening environmental conscience.  Like other indigenous peoples, the 
Sami responded, seeking legal protection for their recognition as distinct communities with, among 
other rights, rights to land and natural resources.246 
Two 1968 decisions of the Supreme Court of Norway illustrate the Sami=s attempts to assert 
 
See also id., quoting the Constitution of Sweden, Chap. 2, Art. 15: ANo law or other decree may imply discrimination 
against any citizen on the ground of his belonging to a minority on account of his race, skin colour or ethnic origin.@
242 Id. at para. 5.3. 
243 Id. at para. 4.2: 
The ratio legis for this legislation is to improve the living conditions for the Sami who have reindeer 
husbandry as their primary income, and to make the existence of reindeer husbandry safe for the 
future.  There have been problems in achieving an income large enough to support a family living on 
reindeer husbandry.  From the legislative history it appears that it was considered a matter of general 
importance that reindeer husbandry be made more profitable.  Reindeer husbandry was considered 
necessary to protect and preserve the whole culture of the Sami . . .  
244 Id. 
245 Id. 
246 See S. James Anaya, Indigenous Rights Norms in Contemporary International Law, 8 ARIZ. J. INT=L &
COMP. L. 1, 4 (1991): AThe subject groups are themselves largely responsible for the mobilization of the international 
human rights program in their favor.  During the 1970's, indigenous peoples organized and extended their efforts 
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their aboriginal dominion over the natural resources of their territory.  In The Brekan Case, the 
Norwegian high court upheld the rights of the Sami to engage in traditional activities of hunting, 
fishing, and berry-picking on the land where the tribe historically pursued these activities.247 In The 
Altevann II Case, the court awarded damages to the Sami for the loss of the tribe=s ability to use an 
area of Sami territory for grazing and fishing due to a government-constructed dam.248 
internationally to secure legal protection for their continued survival as distinct communities with historically based . . . 
entitlements to land.@
247 The Breken Case, RT 1968: 394, at 401 jo. 405-406. 
248 The Altevann II Case, RT 1968: 429, at 437 jo. 440-441. 
2. Kitok v. Sweden 
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The case of Kitok v. Sweden before the Human Rights Committee typifies the 
problems encountered by tribunals in using Article 27 as a means to redress wrongs 
involving land and natural resources.249 
The 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, discussed above, created a 
Human Rights Committee, which is authorized to hear complaints filed against ratifying states 
claiming breach of the Covenant.  Article 27 of the Covenant states that persons belonging to ethnic 
minority groups Ashall not be denied the right . . . to enjoy their own culture . . .@250 In the 1988 case 
of Kitok v. Sweden, the Human Rights Committee considered the applicability of Article 27 to the 
Sami in connection with their traditional practice of herding reindeer.251 
Kitok involved a claim by Ivan Kitok, a man of Sami origin, that by allowing the Sorkaitum 
Sami village, or Asameby,@ to deny his membership in the sameby, the Reindeer Husbandry Act 
breached ICCPR Article 27.252 The Swedish Crown and Lapp bailiff used the authority of the Act to 
limit the number of reindeer breeders by requiring sameby members who leave the reindeer 
husbandry profession for a period of three years to apply for special permission to re-acquire their 
sameby status and thus their sameby-based access to Sami lands and waters, an important aspect of 
reindeer husbandry.253 Kitok belonged to a Sami family that had engaged in reindeer breeding for a 
 
249 Kingsbury, supra note 46, at 212 (analyzing the case and concluding that it represents Aa very uneasy 
compromise . . . [in which] nothing is said about the systemic assimilationist effects of the diminishing resource base or 
other aspects of historic Swedish state policy@). 
250 ICCPR, supra note 91.  The full text of Article 27 reads: 
In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such 
minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group to enjoy 
their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language. 
Id. at Art. 27. 
251 Kitok v. Sweden, supra note 233. 
252 Id. at para. 2.1, describing membership in the sameby as similar to Aa trade union with a >closed shop= rule,@
under the 1971 Act. 
253 Id. at para. 2.2.  See also id. at para. 4.2: 
It should be stressed that a person who is a member of a Sami village also has a right to use land and 
water belonging to other people for the maintenance of himself and his reindeer.  This is valid for State 
property as well as private land and also encompasses the right to hunt and fish within a large part of 
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century, and, as the Human Rights Committee acknowledged, he had Aalways retained some links 
with the Sami community, always living on Sami lands and seeking to return to full-time reindeer 
farming as soon as it became financially possible, in his particular circumstances, for him to do 
so.@254 On these bases, he claimed to have  inherited from his forefathers a civil right not only to 
breed reindeer but to access Sami land and water.255 The Swedish government=s three year rule, 
Kitok claimed, Aarbitrarily denies the immemorial rights of the Sami minority.@256 
Prior to turning to the Human Rights Committee, Kitok exhausted his domestic remedies in 
the Swedish legal system.257 His appeals were denied, ostensibly due to the reluctance of the 
Swedish authorities to overturn a decision by the Sami community on sameby membership.258 
Before the Human Rights Committee, the Swedish government stressed this fact, and also pointed 
out that the Sorkaitum, in its decision denying Kitok=s membership, had allowed that he could 
engage in certain sameby practices, including hunting and fishing free of charge in the community=s
pasture areas, so as to safeguard his interests as Aa reindeer owner in Sami society, albeit not as a 
member of the Sami community.@259 Thus, the state echoed the Swedish administrative court=s
the area in question. 
254 Id. at para. 9.8.  See also id. at para. 2.1. 
255 Id. at para. 2.1. 
256 Id. at para. 2.2. 
257 Kitok v. Sweden, supra note 233, at para. 2.3: A[T]he Regeringsratten (Highest Administrative Court of 
Sweden) decided against [Kitok] on 6 June 1985, although two dissenting judges found for him and would have made 
him a member of the sameby.@
258 Id. at 4.2: 
According to the legislative history of the Act, the County Administrative Board=s right to grant an 
appeal against a decision made by the Sami community should be exercised very restrictively.  It is 
thus required that the reindeer husbandry which the applicant intends to carry out within the 
community be in an essential way useful to the community and that it be of no inconvenience to its 
other members.  An important factor in this context is that the pasture areas remain constant, while 
additional members means more reindeers.  
259 Id. at para. 4.2. 
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conclusion that Ait cannot be said that [Kitok] has been prevented from >enjoying his own culture,=@260 
and in this way made its argument one of self-determination.  In other words, the state argued that 
the Human Rights Committee, like the Swedish government, needed to respect the Sami 
community=s decision as to the mix of allowance and prohibitions that would maintain a balance 
between Kitok=s individual aboriginally-based rights and the Sami community=s right to protect its 
collective cultural resources: 
The conflict that has occurred in this case is not so much a conflict between Ivan 
Kitok as a Sami and the State, but rather between Kitok and other Sami.  As in every 
society where conflicts occur, a choice has to be made between what is considered to 
be in the general interest on the one hand and the interests of the individual on the 
other.  A special circumstance here is that reindeer husbandry is so closely connected 
to the Sami culture that it must be considered part of the Sami culture itself.261 
In such passages, the state read into Article 27 an implication that the guarantees it offers to 
individuals may be eviscerated Ain view of public interests of vital importance or for the protection of 
the rights and freedoms of others.@262 
The idea that Article 27 allows the rights of an individual member of a minority community 
to be sacrificed in favor of the cultural survival of the minority community can be argued to reflect 
the overarching goal of the ICCPR to protect and promote the rights of indigenous peoples to self-
determination.263 In Kitok, however, the situation was more complex, as Swedish law played a role 
in Kitok=s status as a half-Sami, prohibited from full enjoyment of Sami cultural rights.  Indeed, the 
state admitted that Swedish law, by designating the majority of Sami as non-reindeer herding Sami, 
made it difficult for the majority of Sami to maintain their Sami identity: 
 
260 Id. 
261 Id. 
262 Id. at para. 4.3 
263 See supra, notes 91, 96-101 and accompanying text, discussing the ICCPR. 
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The reindeer grazing legislation had the effect of dividing the Sami population of 
Sweden into reindeer-herding and non-reindeer herding Sami, a distinction which is 
still very important.  Reindeer herding is reserved for Sami who are members of a 
Sami village (sameby), which is a legal entity under Swedish law. . . . These Sami . . . 
also have certain other rights, for example, as regards hunting and fishing.  Other 
Sami, however B the great majority . . . B have no special rights under the present law. 
 These other Sami have found it more difficult to maintain their Sami identity and 
many of them are today assimilated into Swedish society.  Indeed, the majority of the 
group does not even live within the area where reindeer-herding Sami live.264 
Still, the state insisted that the Reindeer Husbandry Act did not violate Kitok=s aboriginal right as an 
individual to enjoy his culture in violation of Article 27 because the Act=s purpose was Aprotecting 
and preserving the Sami culture and reindeer husbandry as such.@265 
Kitok argued that the state=s admission that its law led a large segment of the Sami population 
to assimilate was tantamount to an admission that its law violated Article 27.266 Insofar as his own 
case, he pointed out that the Sorkaitum decision to allow him some Sami rights while denying him 
Sami membership did not satisfy Article 27 because Aas a half-Sami he is forced to pay 4,000 to 
5,000 Swedish krona annually as a fee to the Sorkaitum sameby association that the full Sami do not 
pay to that association.@267 He labeled the fee a Astigma on half-Sami@ that prevented him from 
enjoying his cultural heritage and his identity.268 
The Human Rights Committee agreed with Kitok that the Reindeer Husbandry Act played a 
role in setting Kitok=s status in relation to Sami aboriginal rights, and that therefore the question of 
whether Sweden had violated Article 27 was a valid one.269 It also acknowledged that the Act=s
264 Kitok v. Sweden, supra note 233, at para. 4.2. 
265 Id. at para. 4.3. 
266 Id. at para. 5.3: AWhen Sweden says that these other Sami are assimilated, it seems that Sweden confirms its 
own violation of article 27.@
267 Id. at para. 5.4. 
268 Id. 
269 Id. at para. 9.4: AWith regard to the State party=s argument that the conflict in this present case is . . . between 
the author [Kitok] and the Sami community, the Committee observes that the State party=s responsibility has been 
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criteria for making determinations of ethnic community status could be applied unfairly to minority 
individuals, and that this might have happened in Mr. Kitok=s case.270 In spite of these concerns, 
however, the Committee agreed with Sweden that the motives and methods of the Act, as well as its 
application to Mr. Kitok, were consistent with Article 27.271 Thus, the Human Rights Committee 
read the ICCPR to prioritize the collective interests it addresses over the individual rights it also 
claims to preserve.272 
3. Lansman v. Finland: Extending Kitok 
In 1994, the Human Rights Committee extended its Kitok interpretation to allow 
governmental infringement on aboriginal practices even where the government=s actions did not 
support the aboriginal community=s survival or collective will in any way.  In Lansman v. Finland,
the Committee considered another Sami claim alleging violations of ICCPR Article 27.273 Reindeer 
breeders of Sami origin from the area of Angeli and Inari in Finland protested a contract between the 
Finnish Central Forestry Board and a private company that allowed the company to quarry stone in, 
and transport it through, Sami territory.274 Finland cited Kitok to argue that the Committee=s view of 
 
engaged, by virtue of the adoption of the Reindeer Husbandry Act of 1971, and that it is therefore State action that has 
been challenged.@
270 Kitok v. Sweden, supra note 233, at para. 9.7: AThe Committee has been concerned that the ignoring of 
objective ethnic criteria in determining membership of a minority, and the application to Mr. Kitok of the designated 
rules, may have been disproportionate to the legitimate ends sought by the legislation.@
271 Id. at 9.5, defining the purpose of the Act as Ato restrict the number of reindeer breeders for economic and 
ecological reasons and to secure the preservation and well-being of the Sami minority,@ and the method as Athe limitation 
of the right to engage in reindeer breeding to members of the Sami villages.@
272 In 1990, the Human Rights Committee again addressed the relationship between individual and group rights 
under the ICCPR in Ominayak and the Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada. See 1990 Annual Report of the Human Rights 
Committee, U.N. Doc. A/45/40, Vol. II, App. A (1990).  In that case, the Committee applied Article 27 to a claim by the 
Lubicon Lake Band of Canada against the Canadian government alleging that the government=s having allowed the 
province of Alberta to enter leases authorizing oil, gas, and timber exploration in Lubicon territory had led to a situation 
in which the Band=s existence was seriously threatened.  Id. at para. 2.3, 29.1.  The Committee confirmed that Article 27 
applies to claims brought by individuals, whether acting alone or as Aa group of individuals, who claim to be similarly 
affected . . .@ Id. at para. 32.1. 
273 Lansman v. Finland, CCPR/C/52/D/511/1992 (1994). 
274 Id. at para. 2.3. 
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Article 27 allowed states Aa certain degree of discretion@ in regulating indigenous activities, 
particularly where the regulations addressed economic issues.275 The Committee agreed, finding that 
Kitok demonstrated that government actions having a Acertain limited impact@ on an indigenous 
person=s enjoyment of his culture Awill not necessarily amount to a denial of the right under article 
27.@276 
4. Summation 
Kitok stands as an example of the essential and sometimes irreconcilable distinction between 
individual and collective rights.  At the very least, the decision demonstrates that where an 
individual=s attempts to assert his aboriginal heritage came into conflict with the collective 
environmental interests of the indigenous people of which he is a member, the collective interest 
prevailed in the manner of a sovereign or quasi-sovereign authority.  Perhaps more universally, then, 
the decision may stand as a reminder that the human rights of individuals do not necessarily >add up=
to the collective needs of a people, and that self-determination is a concept more effective as an 
effort to assert a group=s autonomy than an individual=s heritage-based rights. 
Another impact of Kitok may be discerned from its aftermath.  By taking the decision out of 
its context in the Lansman decision, the Human Rights Committee seemed to render Article 27 little 
more than a check on wholesale evisceration of aboriginal rights and lands taking place without 
some level of consultation between the state and the aboriginal community.277 These case indicate 
 
275 Id. at para. 7.12.  See also id. at para. 7.13: A[A] margin of discretion must be left to national authorities even 
in the application of article 27.@
276 Id. 
277 Id. at para. 9.6: 
[T]he Committee concludes that quarrying on the slopes of Mt. Riutusvaara . . . does not constitute a 
denial of the [Samis=] right, under article 27, to enjoy their own culture.  It notes in particular that the 
interests of the Muotkatunturi Herdsmens= Committee and of the [Sami petitioners] were considered 
during the proceedings leading to the delivery of the quarrying permit, that the [Sami petitioners] were
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that even where an adjudicatory body created under international law that has as its primary focus the 
protection of indigenous populations from sovereign oppression, judicial deference to the sovereign=s
perspective may permeate the decisional process. 
B. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights on Tribal Rights in the Nicaraguan 
Rainforest 
The impact of the present crisis in Latin America has been compared, in its depth and 
extension, with the Great Depression of 1929-32.  The crisis has made it clear that, 
although the need to protect the environment against the traditional problems of 
deterioration and depletion continues to be a valid objective, policymakers responsible 
for environmental management ought to avoid negative attitudes in the face of the need 
for economic reactivation and growth. 
C Osvaldo Sunkeo, Coordinator, Joint ECLA/UNEP 
 Development & Environmental Unit, 1985278 
1. Background on the Awas Tingni 
The Awas Tingni and other indigenous communities have occupied the Atlantic Coast region 
of Nicaragua for centuries, subsisting via a well-developed culture of hunting, fishing, gathering, and 
communal occupation of the land.279 In spite of long-term efforts by the dominant Nicaraguan 
culture to assimilate these peoples,280 the Atlantic Coast tribes have not integrated into the market 
 
consulted during the proceedings, and that reindeer herding in the area does not appear to have been 
adversely affected by such quarrying as has occurred. 
278 World Commission on Environment and Development Public Hearing, Sao Paulo, 28029 Oct. 1985, quoted 
in OUR COMMON FUTURE, supra note 128, at ch. 3, p. 74 (Oxford Univ. Press ed.). 
279 See The Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights, Judgment of August 31, 2001, at 39-40 [hereinafter >Awas Tingni Judgment=], testimony of Roque de 
Jesus Roldan Ortega: AThe demands of indigenous groups on the Atlantic Coast are based on historical reasons, due to 
millenary occupation of that territory by those peoples, since they were already there at the time of conquest or European 
occupation of that territory by the British and the Spanish.@
According to an anthropologist who testified in the case, the Awas Tingni territory is inhabited by numerous 
communities of people, including the Tasba Raya, Esperanza, the Yapu Muscana, and the Francia Sirpi.  Id. at 23, 
testimony of Theodore Macdonald Jr.  A second anthropologist identified the Turamin Community, the Tuasca, the 
Panamascas, the Wuga, the Puerto Cabezas, and the Kukalaya, and totaled the number of indigenous communities 
making up the Awas Tingni Community as 116.  Id. at 32, testimony of Galio Claudio Enrique Gurdian Gurdian.  See 
also, id. at 37-38, testimony of Charles Rice Hale, anthropologist (describing chronology of Awas Tingni and 
neighboring peoples= settlement of the Atlantic Coast). 
280 See id. at 41, testimony of Roque de Jesus Roldan Ortega: AAll the policies of Latin American States, for 
almost 180 years, were geared toward the elimination of forms of collective property and autonomous forms of 
74 
economy and national culture of the State.281 Through the latter decades of the twentieth century, the 
general policy of Latin American countries shifted from one of integrationism to one of valuing and 
protecting their culturally diverse populations, with Nicaragua one of the first countries to reflect its 
newfound recognition of its indigenous peoples= rights in its laws.282 In 1987, the Sandinista 
government of Nicaragua, urged by the Organization of American States Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights, responded to demands by the Miskito Indians for political autonomy 
by enacting the Autonomy Statute.283 The Autonomy Statute reflects the Nicaraguan government=s
recognition of regional governments of the indigenous communities populating Nicaragua=s Atlantic 
Coast.284 In the early 1990's, however, economic demands focused the Nicaraguan government on 
the Northern Autonomous Region, an indigenous territory rich in tropical hardwood and minerals.285 
government of the indigenous peoples.@
281 Id. at 40. 
282 Id. 
283 Id. 
284 Id. 
[T]he 1987 Constitution and the Autonomy Law . . . established that indigenous peoples have the right 
to recognition of their ownership of the land [and] of their possession of the land . . . [S]ince then the 
indigenous peoples can be considered full owners of the land, and if they have no written titles, they 
can demonstrate their possession through different types of evidence.  Adoption of these norms should 
force the State to abstain from adopting decision regarding the territories occupied the indigenous. . . .  
Indigenous property is private property which belongs collectively to an indigenous people, 
community, or group.  Transactions disposing of it are restricted, taking into account that it is property 
assigned to a group which is a people and wishes to perpetuate itself as a people, and demands that the 
population and territory be maintained. 
285 See Theodore Macdonald, Internationalizing Indigenous Community Land Rights: Nicaraguan Indians and 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, PROGRAM ON NONVIOLENT SANCTIONS AND CULTURAL SURVIVAL (February 
21, 2003). 
See, generally, OUR COMMON FUTURE, supra note 128, at ch. 3, para. 21-24, p. 73-5: 
In the 1970s, Latin America=s economic growth was facilitated by external borrowing.  Commercial 
banks were happy to lend to growing countries rich in natural resources.  Then major changes in 
international conditions made the debt unsustainable.  A global recession restricted export markets, 
and tight monetary policies forces up global interest rates to levels far exceeding any in living memory. 
 Bankers, alarmed by deteriorating creditworthiness, stopped lending.  A flight of indigenous capital 
from developing countries compounded the problem. 
. . . .
. . . . Pressures on the environment and resources have increased sharply in the search for 
new and expanding exports and replacements for imports, together with the deterioration and 
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 Thus, in spite of its race-sensitive rhetoric, the state of Nicaragua continued to treat the Atlantic 
Coast region as state-owned territory, leasing and deeding both the land and its natural resources.286 
In 1995, the Awas Tingni Community learned of a government plan to grant logging rights to 
a Korean timber corporation.287 Forced to seek legal recourse, in September of 1995 the Awas 
Tingni filed an amparo action; this was rejected by the Appellate Tribunal on the basis of a 
technicality, a decision that the Constitutional Court of the Supreme Court of Justice of Nicaragua 
affirmed.288 Only after the Regional Council of the North Atlantic Coast Autonomous Region 
 
overexploitation of the environment brought about by the swelling number of the urban and rural poor 
in desperate struggling for survival.  A substantial part of Latin America=s rapid growth in exports are 
raw materials, food, and resource-based manufactures. 
So Latin American natural resources are being used not for development or to raise living 
standards, but to meet the financial requirements of industrialized country creditors. 
286 See Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua, Judgment, supra note 279, at 37, testimony of Charles Rice Hale, 
anthropologist: 
There have been few concrete actions by the State regarding recognition, titling, and endorsement of 
communal rights to the land.  Only twice has there been land titling more or less in accordance with 
what the community was claiming; that was in 1987, for two Mayagna communities, out of roughly 
300 communities in all.  Since 1990 there has been no action directed toward that goal. 
In some cases, land titles are agrarian allocations which are less than the community=s claims.  
Agrarian allocations are a step prior to legal titling, and in many cases the process is incomplete, 
leading to a statement of intent, but without legalization nor the guarantees that the community 
requires to protect its lands from third parties.  There is no evidence of actions tending to ensure use 
and possession by the communities. 
See also, id. at 26, testimony of Rodolfo Stavenhagen Gruenbaum, anthropologist and sociologist: AIn recent 
decades, indigenous peoples have begun to organize, as they have realized that they have to do something to juridically 
protect and safeguard [their] lands.@
See also id. at 40, testimony of Roque de Jesus Roldan Ortega: 
The Autonomy Statute also states that ownership of indigenous lands by indigenous communities is 
non-attachable, imprescriptible, and inalienable.  In actual practice there are some problems because 
the Agrarian Reform Law, which authorizes giving land to indigenous peoples, was adopted one year 
before the Constitution and the Autonomy Law.  And that Agrarian Reform Law did not recognize a 
special nature of indigenous property, but rather an ownership according to the terms of Nicaragua=s
Civil Code, in other words, that it is an attachable, prescriptible, and alienable property . . . . 
The lands occupied by the indigenous peoples of the Atlantic Coast have been seen as national lands, 
government lands, lands which the State can freely dispose of, and as such they are being given to 
peasant farmers who have been settling in those regions.  The indigenous communities have also been 
given title deeds to land, but these titles are of the same nature as those to lands given to peasant-
farmers. 
287 See Case of the Indigenous Mayagna Community of Awas Tingni (Nicaragua) Before the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights, www.indianlaw.org/body_awas_tingni_summary.htm, at 2 (September, 2001). 
288 Id. at 2-3.  An amparo action is similar to a request for an injunction.  The Matagalpa appellate Tribunal 
initially rejected the Community=s amparo action for the Community=s failure to file the action within thirty days of 
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(ARAAN@) later filed a second amparo action did the Supreme Court declare the logging concession 
unconstitutional, with its decision resting on the fact that the Ministry of the Environment and 
Natural Resources had failed to obtain RAAN approval for the concession, as required under the 
Nicaraguan Constitution.289 
2. The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua before the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights 
 
After the failure of the initial amparo, Jaime Castillo Felipe lodged a petition with the Inter-
American Commission of Human Rights in his own name and on behalf of the Awas Tingni 
Community.290 Like the amparo that had preceded it, the petition claimed that the Nicaraguan 
government was about to enter a contract with a private corporation which would allow it to begin 
logging operations on Awas Tingni communal land.291 The petition requested that the Commission 
order the state of Nicaragua to cease to grant logging concessions in the Awas Tingni territory, and to 
begin the process of demarcating the land of the Awas Tingni Community, as required under the 
 
learning about the infringements on its constitutional rights.  The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment without 
comment. 
289 See Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua, Judgment, supra note 279, at 43, testimony of Lottie Marie Cunningham de 
Aguirre: 
The Awas Tingni Community filed an amparo remedy [an action before the appellate court of 
Nicaragua claiming a breach of the Constitution of Nicaragua] on September 12, 1995 . . . . The 
remedy . . . was not decided [until] almost two years afterwards, on February 27, 1997, without 
responding to the applicant=s claim. 
A second amparo remedy was subsequently filed because the first one was not rejected on the basis of 
land titling, but rather for other reasons, such as not having consulted [with] the Regional Council of 
the RAAN. . . .  
The Court accepted the remedy of unconstitutionality because the Council in full hand not given its 
approval [of the logging concession].  Thus, the Nicaraguan Court declared that the unconstitutionality 
remedy was in order, and it annulled the 1997 concession.  Once the concession was declared 
unconstitutional, the Regional council met and ratified the concession. 
290 Id. at 5.  Although the State of Nicaragua eventually received RAAN approval, the petitioners persisted with 
their claim before the Commission, pointing out in November, 1997 that the core element of the petition was Athe lack of 
protection by Nicaragua of the rights of the [Awas Tingni] Community to its ancestral lands.@
291 Id. at 3. 
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1987 Nicaraguan Constitution and the Autonomy Statute.292 
On March 3, 1998, the Inter-American Commission concluded its report on the situation, 
finding: 
. . . that the State of Nicaragua has not complied with its obligations under the 
American Convention on Human Rights.  The State of Nicaragua has not demarcated 
the communal lands of the Awas Tingni Community or other indigenous 
communities, nor has it taken effective measures to ensure the property rights of the 
Community on its lands.  This omission by the State constitutes a violation of 
Articles 1, 2 and 21 of the Convention . . .293 
Accompanying these findings, the Commission recommended that Nicaragua A[e]stablish a 
procedure in its legal system, acceptable to the indigenous communities involved, that [would] result 
in the rapid official recognition and demarcation of the Awas Tingni territory and the territories of 
other communities of the Atlantic Coast.294 
In its reply, the Nicaraguan government agreed with the Commission=s recommendations, and 
cited various actions it claimed would fulfill them.295 The state also acknowledged that its 
Constitution guarantees the rights of Nicaragua=s indigenous communities, and went on to assert that 
it Ahas faithfully complied with the previous legal provisions and, consequently, it has acted in 
accordance with the national legal system and the provisions of the rules and procedures of the 
[American] Convention [on] Human Rights.@296 
Perceiving that such rhetoric was meaningless in the face of the Nicaraguan government=s
292 See Complaint of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Submitted to the Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights in the Case of the Awas Tingni Mayagna (Sumo) Indigenous Community against the Republic of 
Nicaragua, published at 19 ARIZ. J. INT=L & COMP. LAW 17, 21 (2002). 
293 Id. at 5, quoting Inter-American Commission Report No. 27/98. 
294 Id. at 5-6. 
295 Id. at 6.  The State pointed to its National Commission for the Demarcation of the Lands of the Indigenous 
Communities of the Atlantic Coast and a draft Law on Indigenous Communal Property as means through which it would 
settle its dispute with the Awas Tingni Community and begin the process of demarcation.  It also claimed to have 
canceled the objectionable logging concession, and committed itself to extensive consultation with the indigenous 
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persistent failure to demarcate or otherwise recognize or protect the Awas Tingni territory,297 the 
Commission put the case before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, requesting that the 
Court determine whether the state of Nicaragua had violated provisions of the American Convention 
on Human Rights,298 and also requesting that the Court order the state to adopt: 
the necessary measures to ensure that its officials do not act in such a way that they 
tend to apply pressure on the [Awas Tingni] Community to give up its claim, or that 
tends to interfere in the relationship between the Community and its attorneys, [and . 
. .] that [the State] cease to attempt to negotiate with members of the Community 
without a prior agreement or understanding with the Commission and the Court in 
that regard.299
The Court held public hearings in November of 2000, at which it heard testimony by 
members of the Awas Tingni Community as well as expert witnesses on anthropology, sociology, 
relations between states and indigenous populations, rural titling, and law.300 Awas Tingni 
Community members testified as to the Community=s centuries of occupation of the land, and their 
usage and husbandry of its natural resources.  This history, they asserted, gave the Community a 
communal ownership of the land which neither individual Community members nor the state of 
 
community. 
296 Id. 
297 One observer noted that A[t]here has been no titling of indigenous communities since 1990, [and] the formal 
power of land demarcation and titling has not been exercised. . . . [T]he State seems to have no incentive to solve the 
historical claims of the communities.@ See id. at 31-32, testimony of Galio Claudio Enrique Gurdian Gurdian.  
298 Complaint of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, supra note 292, at 2, citing American 
Convention on Human Rights, Articles 1 (Obligation to Respect Rights), 2 (Domestic Legal Effects), 21 (Right to 
Property), and 25 (Right to Judicial Protection). 
299 Id. at 9, quoting brief submitted by the Commission, dated April 13, 2000.  In a reply, the State of Nicaragua 
denied the accusations of the Commission.  Id. 
300 Id. at 19-47.  Witnesses included Jaime Castillo Felipe, a member of the Awas Tingni Community; Charly 
Webster Mclean Cornelio, Secretary of the Awas Tingni Territorial Committee; Theodore Macdonald Jr., an 
anthropologist; Rodolfo Stavenhagen Gruenbaum, an anthropologist and sociologist; Guillermo Castilleja, Special 
Projects Director for the World Wildlife Fund, Galio Claudio Enrique Gurdian Gurdian, holder of a licentiate degree in 
philosophy and a specialist in social anthropology and development studies with a specialty in relations between States 
and indigenous peoples; Brooklyn Rivera Bryan, an indigenous leader; Humberto Thompson Sang, a member of the 
Lanlaya indigenous community; Wilfredo Mclean Salvador, a member of the Awas Tingni Community; Charles Rice 
Hale, an anthropologist specializing in indigenous cultures; Roque de Jesus Roldan Ortega, an attorney; Lottie Marie 
Cunningham de Aguirre, an attorney; and Marco Antonio Centeno Caffarena, Director of the Office of Rural Titling in 
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Nicaragua had the right to alienate.301 
After hearing arguments by both sides and analyzing the pertinent Nicaraguan constitutional 
and statutory provisions, the Court concluded that the Nicaraguan government was in violation of 
numerous articles of the American Convention on Human Rights.302 In particular, the Court 
addressed Articles 25 and 21.303 Article 25 guarantees prompt and effective recourse to a court for 
 
Nicaragua. 
301 See, e.g., id. at 19-20, testimony of Jaime Castillo Felipe: 
They [the Awas Tingni] are the owners of the land which they inhabit because they have lived in the 
territory for over 300 years, and this can be proven because they have historical places and because 
their work takes place in that territory. . . . 
He and the members of the Community make their living from agriculture, hunting, and fishing, among 
other activities. . . .  The Community selects what is to be consumed, so as not to destroy the natural 
resources. 
The lands are occupied and utilized by the entire Community.  Nobody owns the land individually; the 
land=s resources are collective.  If a person does not belong to the Community, that person cannot 
utilize the land.  There is no right to expel anyone from the Community.  To deny the use of the land to 
any member of the Community, the matter has to be discussed and decided by the Community Council. 
 When a person dies, his or her next of kin become the owners of those things that the deceased person 
owned.  But since lands are collective property of the community, there is no way that one member can 
freely transmit to another his or her rights in connection with the use of the land. 
See also id. at 22, testimony of Charly Webster Mclean Cornelio: 
The territory of the Mayagna [an Awas Tingni tribe] is vital for their cultural, religious, and family 
development, and for their very subsistence, as they carry out hunting activities (they hunt wild boar) 
and they fish (moving along the Wawa River), and they also cultivate the land.  It is a right of all 
members of the Community to farm the land, hunt, fish, and gather medicinal plants; however, sale and 
privatization of those resources is forbidden. 
The territory is sacred for them, and throughout the territory there are several hills which have a major 
religious importance . . . . There are also sacred places, where the Community has fruit trees such as 
pejibaye, lemon, and avocado.  When the inhabitants of Awas Tingni go through these places . . . they 
do so in silence as a sign of respect for their dead ancestors . . . .  
See also id. at 24, testimony of Theodore Macdonald Jr., anthropologist: 
Forms of land use in the Awas Tingni Community are based on a communal system, in which there is 
usufruct by individuals, which means that no one can sell or rent this territory to people outside the 
Community.  However, within the Community, certain individuals use a plot, a certain area, year after 
year.  In this way, the Community respects usufruct rights but does not allow this right to be abused.  
This usufruct right is often acquired through inheritance, passed on from one generation to the next, 
but mainly it is granted by Community consensus.  It can also be transferred from one family to 
another.  Those who benefit from this usufruct have the possibility of excluding other members of the 
community from the use of that land, the utilization of those resources. 
302 The Court cited Articles 1 (Right to State Protection), 25 (Right to Judicial Recourse), 21 (Right to 
Property), 4 (Right to Life), 11 (Right to Privacy), 12 (Freedom of Conscience and Religion), 16 (Freedom of 
Association), 17 (Rights of the Family), 22 (Freedom of Movement and Residence), and 23 (Right to Participate in 
Goverment.)  See id. at 61-81. 
303 The Court held by a vote of seven to one that the State of Nicaragua had violated Article 25, in conjunction 
with the generalized protections of Articles 1(1) and 2, and Article 21, also in conjunction with Articles 1(1) and 2.  Id. at 
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protection against fundamental rights.304 The Court concluded that the state of Nicaragua had failed 
to establish adequate procedures for the demarcation and titling of lands held by indigenous 
communities, and that the government appeared to lack the will to establish such procedures.305 The 
Court found, furthermore, that the Nicaraguan court procedure to hear claims by indigenous peoples 
regarding their constitutional protections was Aillusory and ineffective.@306 Article 21 of the 
Convention protects private property interests.307 The Court found the State to have violated the 
rights of the Mayagna Awas Tingni to the use and enjoyment of their property, in part by granting 
concessions to third parties to exploit land and resources in areas likely to be demarcated as Awas 
Tingni territory.308 
Based on these findings, the Court ordered the Nicaraguan government to create the 
legislative and administrative means to allow delimitation and titling of the Awas Tingni lands, in 
 
87-88.    
304 Complaint of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, supra note 292, at 66, quoting Article 25 to 
state: 
Everyone has the right to simple and prompt recourse, or any other effective recourse, to a competent 
court or tribunal for protection against acts that violate his fundamental rights recognized by the 
constitution or laws [ . . . ] or by this Convention, even though such violation may have been 
committed by persons acting in the course of their official duties. 
305 Id. at 70: A[I]n Nicaragua there is a general lack of knowledge, an uncertainty as to what must be done and to 
whom should a request of demarcation and titling be submitted.@ Citing a March, 1998 study entitled AGeneral 
Diagnostic Study on Land Tenure in the Indigenous Communities of the Atlantic Coast,@which had been prepared by the 
Central American and Caribbean Research Council, the Court also noted that Ain Nicaragua the problem is the lack of 
laws to allow concrete application of the Constitutional principles, or [that] when the laws do exist (case of the Autonomy 
Law) there has not been sufficient political will for them to be regulated.@
306 Id. at 73. 
307 Id. at 78, quoting Article 21 to state: 
1.  Everyone has the right to the use and enjoyment of his property.  The law may subordinate such use 
and enjoyment to the interest of society. 
2.  No one shall be deprived of his property except upon payment of just compensation, for reasons of 
public utility or social interest, and in the cases and according to the forms established by law. 
3.  Usury and any other form of exploitation of man by man shall b[e] prohibited by law. 
308 Id. at 80.  In its discussion of Article 21, the Court noted that the actions of the Nicaraguan State that 
violated its terms also violated Article 1(1) of the Convention, which generally obligates States to respect indigenous 
rights and freedoms and to Aorganize public power so as to ensure the full enjoyment of human rights by the persons 
under its jurisdiction@
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accordance with their customary laws.309 The Court gave the state a fifteen month deadline for 
completing the task, and required that the state do so Awith full participation of the Community and 
taking into account its customary law, values, customs and mores.@310 The Court also ordered the 
state to abstain from actions that might further jeopardize the Awas Tingni lands.311 Finally, the 
Court ordered the state to invest $50,000 in Aworks or services of collective interest for the benefit of 
the Awas Tingni Community.@312 In connection with all of its orders requiring actions, the Court 
required the state to submit to it semiannual reports detailing its progress.313 
3. Aftermath of the Awas Tingni Decision 
The Awas Tingni decision stands as the first case in which an international tribunal has 
recognized the territorial rights of an indigenous people.314 As Claudio Grossman, the Inter-
American Commission=s agent in the case, observed: 
 
309 Id. at 73-74, 85. 
310 Complaint of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, supra note 292, at 85. 
311 Id. 
312 Id. at 86.  The Court also assessed $30,000 of the Awas Tingni Community=s court-related costs against the 
State.  Id. at 86-87. 
313 Id. at 89.  This, along with the orders to develop and implement a system of delimitation, demarcation, and 
titling of indigenous territories, was a unanimous element of the decision. 
314 The Awas Tingni Case C Fifteen Months Later: The Challenges to the Implementation of the Decision of the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in REPORT OF THE INDIAN LAW RESOURCE CENTER in collaboration with the 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW GROUP (on file with author), at 3. 
This is a landmark case in the Inter-American System for the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights. . . . It is appropriate that the first such case should 
examine the property rights of an Indian group because the very culture and existence 
of the Indian community depends upon the land on which they reside. 
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This case is also important because it shows the value of the Inter-American System 
as an avenue to debate (and hopefully settle) very important and complex legal 
matters.  Nicaragua participated fully in the proceedings, showing the vitality of the 
Inter-American System=s framework.  Also, Nicaragua=s active participation renders 
illegitimate any later non-compliance with the Inter-American Court=s decision by the 
government.  For the Awas Tingni, this case also opens up the possibility to achieve 
justice and to establish principles that will help not only their community, but also 
establish precedent for future cases involving the rights of indigenous peoples.315 
Nevertheless, the victory did not readily translate into relief or protection for the Awas 
Tingni.  On January 16, 2003, the Awas Tingni Community filed another action with the Nicaraguan 
appellate court, complaining that state officials had failed to meet the Inter-American Court of 
Human Right=s fifteen month deadline.316 Although the government had set up several joint 
commissions made up of state and indigenous community representatives, and also had made 
progress toward implementing the $50,000 investment element of its obligation, it had failed to make 
significant progress in demarcating and titling the Community=s territory.317 Illegal logging and other 
resource exploitation continued, and the state had failed to sanction those who were plundering the 
indigenous lands.318 
Following the filing of the January 16 suit, in March of 2003 Nicaraguan President Enrique 
 
315 Claudio Grossman, Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua: A Landmark Case of the Inter-American System, 8 HUMAN 
RIGHTS BRIEF OF THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY WASHINGTON COLLEGE OF LAW, Issue 3 (2001). 
316 Id. at 1.  The suit identified the President of Nicaragua and various ministers and government officials as 
having failed to meet the constitutional and international legal obligations identified in the August 31, 2001 Inter-
American Court of Human Rights ruling. 
317 Id. at 4-5.  In connection with the $50,000 investment, the government agreed to construct a student 
boarding house for the Community=s children, and also to donate furniture for the house and sewing machines for the 
Community.  Although the State did not meet the Court-stipulated deadline for these projects, the construction was 
underway as of the deadline.  In connection with the Court order to demarcate and title the Awas Tingni lands, the joint 
commission had met a number of times, but the government had failed to even complete a diagnostic study of the territory 
within the fifteen month period designated for the project.  
318 Id. at 6-7.  In fact, the threats to the Community=s property rights became so severe that it returned to the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, which issued a provisional measures resolution on September 9, 2002.  Under 
the terms of that resolution, the State of Nicaragua was order to adopt immediately all measures necessary to protect the 
lands and natural resources of the  Community. 
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Bolanos met with legal representatives of the Awas Tingni Community.319 The meeting, which 
followed from an invitation issued by President Bolanos while he visited the Organization of 
American States in Washington, D.C., included various Nicaraguan officials, including the Governor 
of the North Atlantic Coast Autonomous Region.320 President Bolanos expressed himself as 
dedicated to complying with the Inter-American Court=s decision, and Professor Hurtado Garcia 
Baker, Coordinator of the RAAN government, called for improvements in cooperation between the 
central and regional governments in their efforts to implement the Court=s mandates.321 Following 
this meeting, an advisor to the President was designated the senior person responsible for 
implementation of the Awas Tingni decision and for coordinating the involved institutions.322 
IV. A Common Future Dawns: The Draft American Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples 
 
Indigenous peoples live off the land; in other words, the possibility of maintaining 
social unity, of cultural preservation and reproduction, and of surviving physically 
and culturally, depends on the collective, communitarian existence and maintenance 
of the land, as has been the case since ancient times.323 
319 Meeting with President Bolanos About the Awas Tingni case, Press Release, Indian Law Resource Center,  
http://www.indianlaw.org (March 26, 2003). 
320 Id. 
321 Id. 
322 Id. The President named Carlos Hurtado, his Atlantic Coast advisor, to this position.  Id. 
323 Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua, Judgment, supra note 279, at 41, testimony of Roque de Jesus Roldan Ortega. 
The Awas Tingni decision has been widely acknowledged as a milestone in international law 
for its acknowledgment and protection of indigenous peoples= environmental rights.  It is 
unsurprising, in this light, that the nations and indigenous peoples of the Americas are currently 
involved in the process of developing an international instrument addressing such rights, or that this 
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instrument reflects a number of the issues that arose in the Awas Tingni case.  The following sections 
discusses the environment-focused provisions of that instrument. 
A. The 1997 Proposed American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
In 1997, the Organization of American States Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
approved a Proposed American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, thereby launching a 
still-ongoing negotiation among OAS participants on its terms and language.324 In general, the 
American Declaration is an ambitious effort to capture the vulnerabilities, strengths, and needs of all 
indigenous peoples of the Americas in the space of twenty-seven Articles.325 In connection with 
environment-related issues, provisions of the 1997 draft American Declaration may be grouped into 
three categories, all of which have a presence in the evolution of international thought on indigenous 
peoples= environmental interests as traced in this Article. 
First, the 1997 version of the American Declaration recognizes that the relationship between  
people and the environment is often the touchstone of indigenous culture, and thus warrants the 
respect and particular attention of the non-indigenous population.  The preamble not only 
acknowledges the unique importance of the natural environment and ecological values in indigenous 
cultures, but also emphasizes this uniqueness by pointing out that the Atraditional collective systems@
that many such cultures rely on in their governance of their lands, resources, water bodies and coastal 
areas often differ from the systems relied on by the nation states within whose borders indigenous 
 
324 PROPOSED AMERICAN DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, OEA/Ser/L/V/.II.95 Doc.6 
(1997). 
325 Id. Articles address human rights (Art. I), legal status (Art. IV), assimilation (Art. V), discrimination (Art. 
VI), cultural integrity (Art. VII), language (Art. VIII), education (Art. IX), religion (Art. X), family relations (Art. XI), 
health (Art. XII), environmental protection (Art. XIII), freedom of association, expression and thought (Art. XIV), right 
to self government (Art. XV), indigenous law (Art. XVI), land, territory, and natural resources (Art. XVIII), workers=
rights (Art. XIX), intellectual property (Art. XX), development (Art. XXI), and treaties, acts, agreements and 
constructive agreements (Art. XXII), among other issues. 
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peoples reside.326 In this way, the 1997 American Declaration rejects antiquated presumptions 
equating indigenous and non-indigenous values and goals. 
A second, related major issue addressed in the 1997 draft American Declaration is the right of 
indigenous peoples to environmental protection.327 After echoing the preamble in linking 
environmental health to the collective well-being of indigenous peoples,328 Article XIII goes on to 
declare that indigenous peoples bear the right to protect their environmental resources, to participate 
in decisionmaking that promises to impact their lands and natural resources, and to have their 
environmental interests  protected by the state within whose borders they reside.329 In this effort to 
empower indigenous peoples with both a voice and authority over their environmental interests, the 
1997 American Declaration reveals its recognition of the need for non-indigenous governments to 
acknowledge some form of quasi-governmental power in indigenous peoples over their 
environmental interests, whether or not the term >sovereignty= itself is utilized.  Indeed, Article XV 
declares the indigenous right to self-govern, listing Aland and resource management, the environment 
 
326 Id. at Preamble, para. 3: 
Recognizing the respect for the environment accorded by the cultures of indigenous peoples of the 
Americas, and considering the special relationship between the indigenous peoples and the 
environment, lands, resources and territories on which they live and their natural resources. 
Id. at Preamble, para. 5: 
Recognizing that in many indigenous cultures, traditional collective systems for control and use of 
land, territory and resources, including bodies of water and coastal areas, are a necessary condition for 
their survival, social organization, development and their individual and collective well-being; and that 
the form of such control and ownership is varied and distinctive and does not necessarily coincide with 
the systems protected by the domestic laws of the states in which they live. 
The 1997 Draft also links environmental interests and indigenous culture by declaring the indigenous peoples=
entitlement to restitution in return for their dispossession of their property in the article addressing cultural integrity.  See 
id. at Art. VII, para. 2. 
327 See id. at Article XIII. 
328 Id. at Art. XIII, para. 1: AIndigenous peoples have the right to a safe and healthy environment, which is an 
essential condition for the enjoyment of the right to life and collective well-being.@
329 Id. at Art. XIII para. 3 (addressing indigenous peoples= rights to Aconserve, restore and protect their 
environment@ and its Aproductive capacity@); para. 2, 4 (addressing indigenous peoples= right to information about impacts 
to their environmental interests and the right to participate in government conservation programs); para. 5, 6, 7 
(addressing indigenous peoples= right to state assistance and protection for environmental and public health purposes).  
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and entry by nonmenbers@ as within the purview of such autonomous self-government.330 
Thirdly, the 1997 American Declaration demands that governments provide the legal means 
for indigenous peoples to protect their environmental interests, including property rights,331 laws 
providing the means to protect, manage and converse natural resources,332 and participatory 
procedures to minimize the environmental impacts of non-indigenous action on indigenous peoples=
environments.333 Acknowledging that the public interest might necessitate relocation of indigenous 
peoples in exceptional circumstances, and also that restitution may not be possible in cases of past 
confiscations of tribal land, the 1997 American Declaration declares the right of indigenous peoples 
to compensation.334 The primary thrust of the Article, however, is that A[i]ndigenous peoples have 
the right to the legal recognition of their varied and specific forms and modalities of their control, 
ownership, use and enjoyment of territories and property.@335 Thus, in addressing the need for non-
indigenous legal systems to acknowledge and protect the environmental interests of indigenous 
 
330 PROPOSED AMERICAN DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, supra note 324, at Art. XV, 
para. 1: 
Indigenous peoples have the right to freely determine their political status and freely pursue their 
economic, social, spiritual and cultural development, and accordingly, they have the right to autonomy 
or self-government with regard to inter alia . . . land and resource management, the environment and 
entry by nonmembers; and to determine ways and means for financing these autonomous functions. 
331 Id. at Art. XVIII, para. 2: AIndigenous peoples have the right to the recognition of their property and 
ownership rights with respect to lands, territories and resources . . .@
332 Id. at Art. XVIII, para. 4: AIndigenous peoples have the right to an effective legal framework for the 
protection of their rights with respect to the natural resources on their lands, including the ability to use, manage, and 
conserve such resources . . .@
333 Id. at Art. XVIII, para. 5: 
In the event that ownership of the minerals or resources of the subsoil pertains to the state or that the 
state has rights over other resources on the lands, the governments must establish or maintain 
procedures for the participation of the peoples concerned in determining whether the interests of these 
people would be adversely affected and to what extent, before undertaking or authorizing any program 
for planning, prospecting or exploiting existing resources on their lands.  The peoples concerned shall 
participate in the benefits of such activities, and shall receive compensation, on a basis not less 
favorable than the standard of international law for any loss which they may sustain as a result of such 
activities. 
334 Id. at Art. XVIII, para. 6, 7. 
335 Id. at Art. XVIII, para. 1. 
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peoples, the 1997 American Declaration demands that the indigenous perspective on such interest be 
accommodated and incorporated to the extent possible. 
B. The 2003 Consolidated Text of the Draft American Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples 
 
In June of 2003, the Chair of the Working Group to Prepare the Proposed American 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples distributed a new draft of the Declaration, its text 
consolidated from the contributions, comments, and proposals submitted on the 1997 draft.336 In a 
number of ways, the 2003 American Declaration underscores the primary message of the 1997 draft, 
which is the appreciation of indigenous peoples as both historically significant and imbued with 
cultural knowledge of importance to both indigenous and non-indigenous peoples.337 The 2003 draft 
makes this theme more explicit, in good part through its prefatory language on the connection 
between indigenous culture and the environment, which it describes as both crucial to indigenous 
survival and valuable for all humankind in its quest to live in harmony with nature.338 In keeping 
with these opening statements, the 2003 draft also adds a new Article VI, which acknowledges the 
indispensability of collective rights in indigenous culture, then demands that signatories honor such 
collectivity.339 
336 CONSOLIDATED TEXT OF THE DRAFT DECLARATION PREPARED BY THE CHAIR OF THE WORKING GROUP,
OEA/Ser.K/XVI/GT/DADIN/doc.139/03, 17 June 2003. 
337 See, e.g., id. at Preamble, para. 1 (describing indigenous peoples as Afoundational societies that form an 
integral part of the Americas [whose] values and cultures are inextricably linked to the identity both of the countries they 
live in and of the region as a whole,@ and noting their Acultural wealth and diversity@).  
338 Id. at Preamble: 
The Member States of the Organization of American States (hereinafter Athe States@), 
RECOGNIZING that the rights of indigenous peoples constitute a fundamental and historically 
significan[t] issue for the present and future of the Americas; 
RECOGNIZING, moreover, the importance for humankind of preserving the indigenous cultures of 
the Americas; 
339 Id. at Art. VI (describing the collective rights of indigenous peoples as Aindispensable for their continued 
existence, well-being, and development as peoples@, then declaring that Athe States recognize, inter alia, the right of the 
indigenous peoples to their collective action@).  
88 
Also more explicit in the 2003 American Declaration is the declaration that indigenous 
peoples must be free to operate their own forms of organization as well as promote their economic, 
social and cultural development.340 Unlike the 1997 draft, the 2003 American Declaration defines 
these freedoms as Athe right to self-determination,@ thus boldly taking on the complexities of that 
concept and the level of autonomy it invites.341 Indeed, in the revised version of the 1997 draft=s
provision on self-government, the 2003 American Declaration states: AIndigenous peoples, in the 
exercise of the right to self-determination within the States, have the right to autonomy or self-
government with respect to, inter alia, . . . administration of land and resources, environment and 
entry of non-members . . . .@342 Thus, the 2003 American Declaration explicitly recognizes the 
environmental interests of indigenous peoples as among the very basic elements of self-
determination.343 
Articles addressing the right to environmental protection, land, and natural resources, already 
containing detailed provisions in the 1997 American Declaration, remained relatively intact in the 
2003 draft.344 Alterations worth noting include the additional emphasis on the scope of indigenous 
peoples= environmental rights being asserted, as well as the centrality of those rights to indigenous 
culture, with the 2003 draft containing declarations of indigenous peoples= rights to Alive in harmony 
 
340 Id. at Art. III: AWithin the States, the right to self-determination of the indigenous peoples is recognized, 
pursuant to which they can define their forms of organization and promote their economic, social, and cultural 
development.@
341 Id. See also id. at Art. XX (also referencing the Aright of self-determination within the States@).  By adding 
the phrase Awithin the States,@ the drafters apparently seek to avoid the implication that the American Declaration invites 
indigenous peoples to assert full autonomy, declaring themselves to be fully separate nations.  
342 CONSOLIDATED TEXT OF THE DRAFT DECLARATION PREPARED BY THE CHAIR OF THE WORKING GROUP, supra 
note 336, at Art. XX, para. 1. 
343 Additional elements of self-determination include culture, language, spirituality, education, information, 
means of communication, health, housing, employment, social well-being, maintenance of community security, family 
relations, and economic activities.  See id. 
344 See id. at Art. XVIII: ARight to environmental protection,@ and Article XXIV: ATraditional forms of property 
and cultural survival.  Right to land, territory, and resources.@
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with nature@ and to Aconserve, restore, make use of, and protect@ their environment, along with a 
declaration of indigenous rights to the Asustainable management of their lands, territories, and 
resources.@345 In keeping with these environmental rights, the 2003 draft also expanded its 
description of the property rights of indigenous peoples, including sustenance among the historical 
uses warranting recognition under property law, and expanding the scope of property rights to 
include Athe waters, coastal seas, flora, fauna, and all other resources of that habitat, as well as their 
environment . . .@346 
State responsibilities toward indigenous peoples were also amplified in the 2003 draft=s
environmental protection section, which claims for indigenous peoples consultation rights in 
connection with potential impacts on their environment as well as participation rights in the 
Aorganization and implementation of government programs and policies to conserve and exploit their 
land, territories, and resources.@347 The 2003 draft also adds to the state responsibility to prohibit and 
punish the introduction of polluting materials to indigenous lands the additional duty to prevent such 
illegal activity.348 Similarly, the property rights section of the 2003 draft charges states with the 
 
345 See id. at Art. XVIII, para. 1: AIndigenous peoples have the right to live in harmony with nature and to a 
healthy and safe environment, which are essential conditions for enjoyment of the right to life, to their spirituality, and to 
collective well-being.@ See also id. at Art. XVIII, para. 2: AIndigenous peoples have the right to conserve, restore, make 
use of, and protect their environment, and to the sustainable management of their lands, territories, and resources.@
346 Id. at Art. XXIV, para. 1.  In connection with the sustenance right, the 2003 draft notes that the indigenous 
peoples= property interest must Arespect[ ] the principles of the legal system of each State.@ In connection with the 
statement of indigenous rights over waters, coastal seas, flora, fauna and other resources, the 2003 draft states that 
indigenous peoples will use such interests to Apreserv[e] these for themselves and future generations.@ Id. 
347 See id. at Art. XVIII, para. 3: AIndigenous peoples have the right to be informed and consulted with respect 
to measures that may affect their environment, as well as to participate in actions and decisions that may affect it.  See 
also id. at Art. XVIII, para. 4: AIndigenous peoples have the right to participate fully in the formulation, planning, 
organization, and implementation of government programs and policies to conserve and exploit their lands, territories, 
and resources.@
348 CONSOLIDATED TEXT OF THE DRAFT DECLARATION PREPARED BY THE CHAIR OF THE WORKING GROUP,
supra, note 342, Art. XVIII, para. 6: AThe State shall prohibit, punish, and prevent, in conjunction with the indigenous 
authorities, the introduction, abandonment, or deposit of radioactive materials or waste, or toxic substances or waste, in 
violation of legal provisions inforce; as well as the production, introduction, transit, possession, or use of chemical, 
biological, or nuclear weapons on indigenous lands and territories.@
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responsibility to Aestablish the special regimes appropriate for [the] recognition [of indigenous forms 
of property, possession, and ownership of their lands and territories], and for their demarcation or 
titling.@349 The property rights section also underscores the need for states to acknowledge and 
accommodate the fact that indigenous and non-indigenous systems for allocating interests in land are 
likely to differ, expressly asserting that >[i]ndigenous peoples have the right to attribute ownership 
within the community in accordance with the values, usages, and customs of each peoples.@350 
As noted above, the American Declaration remains the subject of negotiation among OAS 
member states.  The Delegation of the United States, for example, in 2004 offered an edited general 
statement of indigenous peoples= environmental interests, striking the phrase Ahave the right@ and 
offering Aare entitled@ in its stead, a change that appears motivated to invite the interpretation of such 
 
349 See id. at Art. XXIV, para. 2 (discussing indigenous peoples= rights Ato legal recognition of the various and 
particular modalities and forms of property, possession, and ownership of their lands and territories . . .@).  See also id. at 
Art. XXIV, para 6 (requiring the States to Atake adequate measures to avert, prevent, and punish any intrusion or use of 
[indigenous peoples=] lands, territories, or resources by persons from outside@); para. 8 (charging States with the 
responsibility to Aprovide, within their legal systems, a legal framework and effective legal remedies to protect the rights 
of the indigenous peoples referred to in this article@). 
350 Id. at Art. XXIV, para. 5. 
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rights as falling short of serving as a basis for a judicial claim.351 In the same edited phrase, the U.S. 
Delegation sought to diminish the concept of indigenous rights as collective, and also to delete any 
acknowledgment that environmental rights play a role in tribal identity or culture.352 
351 Fourth Meeting of Negotiations in the Quest for Points of Consensus; Proposal to Amend Articles XIX to 
XXIII and Section Six of the Draft American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, OEA/Ser. 
K/XVI/GT/DADIN/doc.192/04 rev.1, 11 Nov. 2004: 
PROPOSAL BY THE DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES 
Article XVIII: Environmental Protection 
1.  Indigenous peoples and their members, like all human beings, are entitled [have the right to live] to 
a healthy and productive life in harmony with nature. [which is essential for enjoyment of their right to 
life, to their spirituality, and to collective well being]. 
352 Id. The U.S. draft attempts to dilute references to the collective nature of indigenous peoples= environmental 
interests by adding the language Aand their members@ as well as by striking the final phrase of the original draft, which 
refers to the collective well being of indigenous peoples.  The U.S. draft attempts to dilute the idea of environmental 
rights being of particular cultural value to indigenous peoples by adding the phrase Alike all human beings@ and, again, by 
striking the final phrase of the original draft, which characterizes environmental interests as Aessential@ to a tribe=s
Aspirituality@ and Acollective well being.@
The world has yet to witness the outcome of the negotiations among the Organization of 
American States.  The process, however, verifies that a momentum is observable in both 
international instruments and court decisions, and that this momentum favors the recognition of 
indigenous peoples= self-determination as well as the fact that environmental interests lie at the core 
of any effort to honor that self-determination.  
V. Conclusion 
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Empowerment of indigenous peoples is no panacaea to planetary environmental and human 
problems.  Empowerment of indigenous peoples in resource decision-making brings no 
guarantee of more equitable or sustainable local outcomes, as many indigenous peoples have 
internalised many of the values of industrial society.  Yet empowerment of indigenous peoples is 
a necessary step in creating new political and cultural spaces in which to shape alternatives to 
the New World Order.  In this sense, then, empowerment of indigenous peoples will involve the 
decolonisation of indigenous spaces, and the development of new ways of seeing the 
relationships between resource industries, their host communities, and the wider industries and 
communities that rely on them.353 
From the concepts, international rhetoric, and cases discussed above, it may be observed that, 
if nothing else, linguistic tools intended for the protection of indigenous peoples= environmental 
rights do exist.  Furthermore, this Article=s survey of international instruments illustrates that the 
world=s appreciation for the crucial role that the environment plays in indigenous cultures appears to 
be both widespread and strengthening.  Certainly the pace of the international community=s evolution 
from a paternalistic, assimilationist perspective to one that has only just begun to accepts the rhetoric 
of indigenous peoples= self-determination stands as a testimonial to the overall hesitance of the 
world=s dominant cultures to embrace the positive values offered by indigenous peoples, including 
the racial and cultural diversity they offer, their importance to the historical heritage of so much of 
the world, and, of course, their superior knowledge about nature and particularly about systems of 
sustainable development. 
As one commentator has observed, Ainternational law is no monolith, but is more like a 
network of interlinked, evolving and eminently challengeable assumptions.@354 But the Awas Tingni 
decision, along with the draft American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, are 
unambiguous signs that international law and international lawmakers are primed to translate the 
 
353 Howitt, Connell, Hirsch, supra note 34, at 21. 
354 THORNBERRY, supra note 2, at 87(discussing changing perspectives on indigenous peoples and indigenous 
authority over time). 
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positive rhetoric on indigenous peoples into actions that defend both the cultural heritage of 
indigenous peoples and, at the same time, some of the earth=s environmental resources.  Indeed, 
inspired by these and other events in international law, in December of 2004 the United Nations 
General Assembly adopted a resolution that launched the Second International Decade of the World=s
Indigenous Peoples, which commenced January 1, 2005.355 The goals of for this decade include Athe 
further strengthening of international cooperation for the solution of problems faced by indigenous 
peoples in such areas as culture, education, health, human rights, the environment and social and 
economic development, by means of action-oriented programmes and specific projects, increased 
technical assistance and relevant standard-setting activities.@356 And although this announcement 
may be dismissed as no more than a rhetorical gesture, it is heartening to anticipate the continuation 
of the positive momentum in the world=s appreciation for the environmental values of indigenous 
cultures.        (Draft Date: August 3, 2005) 
 
355 U.N.G.A. Press Release (December 20, 2004), http://www.org/News/Press/docs/2004/ga10321.doc.htm,
referencing U.N.G.A., A/C.3/59/L/30 (October 22, 2004), at para. 1. 
356 Id. at para. 2. 
